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Executive Summary
It is the year 2005 and the Managing Director of Biomat has a problem. Her spin-
off firm builds replacement human organs using metagenic technology, but after
two years of success Biomat is at a crossroads. Should it stick to metagenics, which
is costly and prone to production problems, or should it use the latest ultragenic
approaches - still unproven but likely to yield great cost reductions?
She switched on her videophone and traced the local head of RIB, the Regional In-
novation Bureau of ENDBITS, the European Network of Distributed Bureaux of
Intelligence for Technology Strategies. RIB helped her to prepare a videonote on
technology options. It ran a standard search on the European Foresight Bank, an
electronic tool which logged all of the world's foresight outputs and used AI algo-
rithms to cluster the results and build scenarios. Recent expert assessments all
looked good for ultragenics, but RIB advised her not to rely solely upon foresight
results – however positive. Social and regulatory problems were also possible, and
the Bureau had heard of some problems in Austria.
RIB used the Technology Assessment directory to identify the main Austrian experts
in the field and confirmed that ultragenics had been subject to ethical challenges
from a local religious foundation. RIB then called for more information and
scanned the recordings of the Consensus Conference. Relief! The objections were
based on a misunderstanding of the procedures for ultragenics (which unlike earlier
approaches did not depend upon foetal cells) and the citizens’ jury had come out in
favour of the technology.
Biomat was ready to launch its ultragenics research programme, but was worried
about the cost. RIB pointed out that all three of the European Research Framework
Programme agencies offered support, but noted that recent evaluations praised the
Prague office for its fast turnaround of proposals and claims.
“Thanks RIB” said the Biomat MD. “Life without ENDBITS just wouldn’t be the
same.”
The basic premise of this report is that more and better access to relevant informa-
tion makes for better decision-making and sounder decisions. Whether located in
the public or private sector, decision-makers concerned with technology choices,
strategies and policies need a wide range of high quality intelligence inputs in order
to make wise decisions.
2Traditionally, policymakers and strategists dealing with technology and innovation
have used a number of "intelligence" tools and techniques to provide them with the
data they need to formulate appropriate policies and strategies. In the public sector,
for example, innovation policy formulation has been improved in recent years via
the use of Technology Foresight, Technology Assessment and Policy Evaluation
exercises. All have yielded valuable information which has helped policymakers
make wise technology choices and fine-tune courses of action.
In future, however, more will be needed. The complexity of the modern world and
the crucial role innovation plays within modern economies and social structures
make it imperative that intelligence tools are improved and access to the results of
intelligence exercises carried out across the globe is enhanced.
In this report we review the use of a number of intelligence tools in innovation poli-
cymaking before going on to examine how they could be used in different combina-
tions to enhance strategic intelligence inputs into policymaking. Critically, we also
examine the need for a system of "Distributed Intelligence" which could provide
policymakers with access to strategic intelligence outputs produced in different lo-
cations for different reasons. Specifically, we use a number of stylised "fictions"
such as the Biomat example to explore the design requirements of a "system archi-
tecture" for distributed intelligence.
In the concluding section we consider innovation policymaking in Europe and con-
template some of the steps needed to improve the use of intelligence tools and to
build an effective European system of distributed intelligence. The aim is not to
specify in detail the shape of a monolithic ENDBITS, but to suggest just a few of
the ways in which Europe could improve innovation policymaking and, ultimately,
innovation policy.
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51. Introduction: Improved Strategic Intelligence for
Policy Formulation in Complex Innovation Systems
Preamble
HAMLET.
... Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry
And lose the name of action ...
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 1
Hamlet's concern may well apply to this report. The authors' academic "conscience"
may have made "cowards" of them, and "the pale cast of their thought" may have
obstructed an "enterprise of great pitch and moment". The authors, nevertheless, are
confident that the open-minded reader will recognize that there is some "name of
action" inherent to the ideas put forward by this report.
The report has been produced by members of the Advanced Science and Technology
Policy Planning Network1 – a network set up as part of the Targeted Socio-
Economic Research Programme of the European Union. Details of the network, its
task and workshops conducted can be found in Appendix 1.
The aim of the report is to explore and suggest ways in which innovation policy and
innovation policymaking can be improved. Innovation policy is here defined as the
entire scope of related public measures of science, research, technology policy,
overlapping also with industrial, environmental, labour and social policies.
                                                
1 Members of the Network were: Stefan Kuhlmann (Network Co-ordinator), Fraunhofer Institute
for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), Karlsruhe, Germany; Ken Guy and Patries Boekholt,
Technopolis Ltd., Brighton, Great Britain; Jean-Alain Héraud, Bureau d’économie théorique et
appliquée (BETA), Univ. Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg, France; Yannis Katsoulacos, Center for E-
conomic Research and Environmental Strategy (CERES), Athens, Greece; Philippe Laredo,
Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation (CSI), Ecole des Mines, Paris, France, and Bas de Laat
(meanwhile Technopolis); Tarmo Lemola and Terttu Luukkonen, Group for Technology Studies,
Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT-GTS), Espoo, Finland; Denis Loveridge and Luke
Georghiou, Programme of Policy Research in Engineering, Science & Technology (PREST), U-
niv. of Manchester, Great Britain; Antonio Moniz, Univ. Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciencias
e Tecnologia, Lisbon, Portugal; Wolfgang Polt and Fritz Ohler, Austrian Research Centre Sei-
bersdorf (ARCS), Austria; Arie Rip and Barend van der Meulen, Dept. of Philosophy of Science
and Technology, Univ. of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands; Luis Sanz-Menendez, Consejo Superi-
or de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (CSIC-IESA), Mad-
rid, Spain; Ruud Smits, Univ. of Tilburg and TNO (meanwhile Univ. of Utrecht) and Pim den
Hertog, TNO (meanwhile Dialogic), Netherlands.
6The policy challenge confronting society is to evolve policies capable of effectively
nurturing innovation within modern economies and social structures – a task made
intrinsically difficult by the complexity of innovation systems and their dynamics.
One way of enhancing policymaking is to improve the Strategic Intelligence (SI)
upon which policy choices and decisions are based. In the past this intelligence was
generated via tools such as Evaluation (EV), Technology Foresight (TF) and Tech-
nology Assessment (TA). Improving the way these tools are used is one way of im-
proving strategic intelligence and hence policymaking.
In this report we argue that there is now a need to go further. In particular, we sug-
gest two key developments, namely
• the development of Enhanced Tools (ET), i.e. SI tools which can be used in dif-
ferent combinations to enhance strategic intelligence inputs into policymaking
• the exploitation of Distributed Intelligence (DI), i.e. access to, and exploitation
of, SI produced in different locations for different reasons
Furthermore, in order to produce Improved Strategic Intelligence, there is a need to
develop the institutional infrastructures which will allow both the use of enhanced
tool combinations and facilitate the combination of multiple intelligence inputs
from an accessible distributed intelligence architecture.
In developing our ideas about Distributed and Improved Strategic Intelligence we
might have "overshot the mark" – if the horizon is defined by innovation policy-
planning and -making concepts still normally in use. Also, one might accuse us of
presenting ideas of a far too theoretical and generalistic nature, not immediately
applicable to the real world of innovation policymaking. Well, such critics may be
right, though it is only broad-minded thinking that helps to overcome the "path de-
pendencies" of conventional taken-for-granted practices. Moreover, we shall present
a couple of examples providing at least some empirical evidence of the emergence
of Distributed and Improved Strategic Intelligence.
In the remainder of this report we develop these ideas. Chapter 2 considers the de-
velopment and use of strategic intelligence tools such as EV, TF and TA. It explores
ways of improving these individual tools and ways in which they can be used in
combination to produce more useful strategic intelligence. Chapter 3 goes on to
describe the main elements of distributed intelligence and argues why there is an
increasing need for policymakers to access multiple intelligence sources when for-
mulating effective innovation policies. This will be illustrated by four "fictions", i.e.
short stories of future uses of "Improved Strategic Intelligence": (1) an SME consid-
ering a strategic technological move; (2) a region considering its new "education,
research and innovation" contracts with the nation and the EU; (3) developing a new
EU technology programme; (4) facing a new collective risk - the Ebola virus. In
chapter 4, conclusions are drawn and suggestions made regarding the development
of an infrastructure capable of supporting new tool combinations and access to dis-
tributed intelligence.
71.1 Complex Innovation Systems and the Need for Improved
Strategic Intelligence
Science, technology and innovation have long been recognised as important drivers
of economic development. Indeed, some would argue that they now occupy a posi-
tion of critical centrality in modern economic and social structures. As such, poli-
cymakers have become increasingly interested in the development of policies to
ensure that science, technology and innovation continue to underpin economic de-
velopment.
Other factors have also fuelled an interest in innovation policies. Science and tech-
nology are neither costless nor necessarily benign activities, and society has a right
to become involved in determining the level of resources devoted to them. Society
also has a role to play in shaping and determining the directions in which scientific
developments are allowed to evolve. The need for societal choice and control thus
implies the need for science, technology and innovation policies.
Specifying these policies is not easy, however. Analysts in the field have abandoned
simplistic models of how innovation and innovation processes work. It is increas-
ingly recognised that the dynamics of so-called "innovation systems"2 are complex
and difficult to understand, and that scientific and technological communities, not to
mention the "users" of their products, face a number of challenges, both now and in
the future3:
(1) The nature of technological innovation processes is changing. The production
of highly sophisticated products makes increased demands on the science base,
necessitating inter- and trans-disciplinary research and the fusion of heteroge-
neous technological trajectories.4 New patterns of communication and interac-
tion are emerging which researchers, innovators and policymakers have to rec-
ognise and comprehend;
                                                
2 Or (national) "systems of innovation"; see Freeman, C. (1987): Technology Policy and Economic
Performance: Lessons from Japan, London (Pinter); Lundvall, B.-Å. (1992) (ed.): National Sys-
tems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London (Pinter);
Nelson, R. R. (ed.) (1993): National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford/New
York (Oxford University Press); Edquist, Ch. (1997) (ed.): Systems of Innovation. Technologies,
Institutions and Organizations, London/Washington (Pinter).
3 See also Lundvall, B.-Å. / Borrás, S. (1998): The globalising learning economy: Implications for
innovation policy, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities)
(Targeted Socio-Economic Research).
4 See e.g. Grupp, H. (ed.) (1992): Dynamics of Science-Based Innovation, Berlin et a. (Springer);
Kodama, F. (1995): Emerging Patterns of Innovation. Sources of Japan’s Technological Edge,
Boston (Harvard Business School Press).
8(2) The "soft side of innovation"5 is also of growing importance. Non-technical
factors such as design, human resource management, business re-engineering,
consumer behaviour and "man-machine interaction" are critical to the success
of innovation-processes. As a consequence, the learning ability of all actors in
the innovation process is challenged and it becomes more appropriate to speak
about a "learning economy" than a "knowledge-based economy"6.
(3) These first two points are specific manifestations of what Gibbons et al7 call
the transition from mode-1 science to mode-2 science. Mode-1 refers to tradi-
tional science-driven modes of knowledge production. Mode-2 refers to
knowledge production processes stimulated and influenced far more by de-
mand, in which many actors other than scientists also have important and rec-
ognised roles to play.
(4) The pressure on the science and technology (S&T) and the innovation system
to function more effectively is complemented by similar pressures to function
more efficiently, largely driven by the growing costs of S&T. This will require
a much better understanding of the research system itself8. In this respect, SI
(e.g. S&T policy evaluations) can help sharpen insights into the internal dy-
namics of S&T and their role in innovation systems.
(5) Within more demand-oriented national and regional innovation systems, sci-
entists are under increasing pressure to produce results in terms of concrete
solutions for societal problems and contributions to the competitiveness of the
national economies. This necessitates effective links between the supply and
demand sides of knowledge production, which in turn increases the demand
for Strategic Intelligence.
(6) European innovation policymakers have to co-ordinate or orchestrate their
interventions with an increasing range and number of actors in mind (e.g.
European authorities; various national government departments and regional
agencies in an expanding number of member states; industrial enterprises and
associations; trade unions and organised social movements etc.). Furthermore,
the accession of new Eastern European member states will undoubtedly in-
crease the importance of this aspect.
                                                
5 See e.g. Den Hertog, P. / Bilderbeek, R. / Maltha, S. (1997): Intangibles. The soft side of innova-
tion. In: Futures, Vol. 29, No.1, 33-45.
6 This is recommended "since the high pace of change means that specialised knowledge becomes
much more of a short-lived resource and that it is rather the capability to learn and adapt to new
conditions that increasingly determines the performance of individuals, firms, regions and coun-
tries" (Lundvall/Borrás 1998, 31).
7 Michael Gibbons et al. (1994) The new production of knowledge: the dynamics of science and
research in contemporary societies. London: Sage Publications.
8 See e.g. Rip, A. / van der Meulen, B. (1997): The post modern research system, in: Barré, R. /
Gibbons, M. / Maddox, J. / Martin, B. / Papon, P. (eds.): Science in Tomorrow's Europe, Paris
(Economica International), 51-67.
9(7) The growing cost of S&T is also likely to accelerate the increasing interna-
tional division of labour in the European S&T system, a development which
will increase both the pressure and the need for a highly strategic, though not
necessarily a centralised, European S&T policy.
(8) Since the 1980s, the adaptability of the innovation systems to changing mar-
kets has been perceived with increasing clarity as a critical factor in the inter-
national competitiveness of the participating economic actors9. In the transi-
tion to the 21st century the national (and regional) innovation systems are ex-
periencing revolutionary shockwaves: the increasing pull of "globalising" eco-
nomic relationships has mixed up ingrained regional or national divisions of
labour between industrial enterprises, educational and research institutions, as
well as administration and politics, and devalued many of their traditional
strengths. Up to now, however, globalisation has not led to conformity of the
national innovation systems, which would result in their abolition. Rather, the
various innovation cultures react in quite different ways, which in some cases
leads to crises, in others to stability, and in some reveals unsuspected, novel
chances in the transformed global context – a challenge to public innovation
policies.
(9) Finally, Europe has to overcome the so-called European Paradox – the rela-
tively weak ability of Europe to capitalise upon a comparatively strong scien-
tific position in terms of industrial innovation.
Policy-formulation in these circumstances is not straightforward. There is increasing
pressure on policymakers to:
• increase efficiency and effectiveness in the governance of science and technol-
ogy;
• make difficult choices in the allocation of scarce resources for the funding of
science and technology;
• help preside over the establishment of an international division of labour in sci-
ence and technology acceptable to all actors involved;
• integrate "classical" innovation policy initiatives with broader socio-economic
targets, such as reducing unemployment, fostering the social inclusion of less
favoured societal groups and regions, as claimed in particular by the 5th Frame-
work Programme of the European Commission;
• acknowledge, comprehend and master the increasing complexity of innovation
systems (more actors, more aspects, more levels etc.);
• adapt to changes in the focus of innovation policies between international
(growing), national (declining) and regional (growing) levels.
 Over the last two decades, considerable efforts have been made to improve inputs
into the design of effective science, technology and innovation policies. In particu-
                                                
9 See e.g. M.E. Porter (1990): The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London (Macmillan).
10
lar, formalised methodologies have been introduced and developed which attempt to
analyse past behaviour (EV)10, review technological options for the future (TF)11,
and assess the implications of adopting particular options (TA)12.
 Achievements in these areas have been impressive. As a complement of EV, TF and
TA, other intelligence tools such as comparative studies of the national, regional or
sectoral "technological competitiveness", benchmarking methodologies etc. were
developed and used. Policymakers at regional, national and international levels have
all benefited from involvement in these processes and exploited their results in the
formulation of new policies. Increasingly, however, it has become obvious to both
policymakers and the analysts involved in the development and use of SI tools that
there is scope for improvement. In particular, there is a need to improve existing SI
tools and use them in more flexible and intelligent ways, combining them in indi-
vidual exercises to satisfy the multiple needs of innovation policymakers. These are
the concepts we try to capture in this report via the use of the term Enhanced Tools
(ET).
 There is a further need, however, to exploit potential SI synergies within what we
call a system of Distributed Intelligence. Currently policymakers in different parts
of the world independently call for localised SI activities to be customised to their
own particular needs. In this report, however, we argue that the results of many of
these exercises have a didactic value in other contexts. We also argue that the com-
petence, which exists within the SI community as a whole, can also be exploited
more broadly by policymakers in localised settings.
If the use of Enhanced Tools is combined with the effective exploitation of Distrib-
uted Intelligence, we believe the result will be Improved Strategic Intelligence.
Before considering these issues further in Chapters 2 and 3, however, further dis-
cussion is needed of the context within which infrastructural changes will be
                                                
10 See e.g. the survey of various European national systems of evaluation by Georghiou, L. (1995):
Research evaluation in European National Science and Technology Systems. In: Research
evaluation, Vol. 5, No. 1, 3-10; Papaconstantinou, G. / Polt, W. (1997): Policy Evaluation in In-
novation and Technology: An Overview. In: OECD (ed.): Policy Evaluation in Innovation and
Technology. Towards Best Practices, Paris (OECD); Callon M. / P. Laredo / Mustar, P. (1997):
The Strategic Management of Research and Technology, Paris (Economica International).
11 For various approaches and ways of implementation of technology foresight see Martin, B.
(1995): Foresight in Science and Technology. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic Management
vol. 7, no. 2, 140; Cameron, H. / Loveridge, D. / Cabrera, J. / Castanier, L. / Presmanes, B. / Vas-
quez, L. / van der Meulen, B. (1996): Technology Foresight - Perspectives for European and In-
ternational Co-operation, Manchester (PREST: Mimeo); Grupp, H. (1998) (ed.): Technological
Forecasting & Social Change; Special Issue on Recent National Foresight Activities, Vol. 57.
12 See e.g. Rip, A./ Misa, Th.J. / Schot, J. (eds.) (1995): Managing Technology in Society. The
Approach of Constructive Technology Assessment, London/New York (Pinter); see also Interna-
tional Journal of Technology Management (1996): Special Publication on Technology Assess-
ment (Guest editor: Denis Loveridge), Vol. 11, Nos 5/6.
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needed. In particular, fuller coverage is needed of the complexity of modern-day
innovation policymaking in multi-actor/multi-level arenas.
1.2 Innovation Policy in Multi-Actor/Multi-Level Arenas
This section provides a set of assumptions, based on our analysis of the functioning
of advanced SI in complex innovation systems.
First of all, our analysis is based on a twofold basic assumption: Innovation policy-
making - using SI - is pursued by political-administrative institutions and actors
(e.g. ministries for S&T), by research organisations and by R&D-based companies,
seeking to learn in order to improve their institutional performance and the precon-
ditions for institutional survival or even growth (functional assumption) and to con-
tribute to socio-economic modernisation (normative assumption). In doing so S&T
and political actors find themselves confronted with
• given general issues of innovation policymaking (public and private policy),
moulded by the emerging and constantly changing role of S&T and innovation in
economy and society (as sketched in section 1.1 above),
• given arenas and configurations with other actors in terms of resources (finan-
cial, knowledge), and of regulations and institutions (political, economic), partly
determining and partly facilitating their actions.
 
 Arenas and Actor Configurations
 Assumption 1: A linear model of policymaking as a consequential process (typical
steps: formulation, agenda setting, decisions, implementation, evaluation, formula-
tion ...)13 is no longer appropriate, at least not in the field of S&T policies. Here, all
typical steps are more or less interacting, thereby describing "loops"14: Ideally,
looping policy processes provide "stopping points" where policy-shaping activities
converge in a way that effective acting is feasible (see figure 1.1).
 Entry options for SI could be found at (1) such stopping points, (2) ad hoc opportu-
nities, or (3) if it has been institutionalised as a steady monitoring process. The
emergence of SI knowledge as a policy resource on the one hand and structural and
institutional preconditions of using SI activities on the other influence and transform
                                                
 13 See e.g. Brewer, G.D./de Leon, P. (1983): The Foundation of Policy Analysis, Homewood, Ill.,
17-21
 14 Y. Dror discussed already 30 years ago - though in the context of a rationalistic and quite sophis-
ticated policymaking model – the many communication and feedback loops that connect all the
phases and subphases of optimal policymaking with each other (Dror, Y. (1968): Public Policy-
making Reexamined, San Francisco/CA (Chandler), 191f).
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each other. Often it is external pressure on policy actors and the related arenas that
gives the impulse for the production and application of advanced SI.
Figure 1.1: Looping Policy Processes
 
 
 Assumption 2: Innovation policy is rather (and increasingly) a matter of networking
between heterogeneous (organised) actors instead of top-down decisionmaking and
implementation. Policy decisions frequently are negotiated in multi-level/multi-
actor arenas and related actor networks15; given power structures and the shape of
arenas, nevertheless, may vary considerably between member states (or regions) or
corporations (see figure 1.2). "Successful" policymaking normally means compro-
mising through alignment and "re-framing"16 of stakeholders’ perspectives.
 Assumption 3: Negotiating actors pursue different - partly contradicting - interests,
represent different stakeholders perspectives, construct different perceptions of "re-
ality"17, refer to diverging institutional "frames". Different actors having different
responsibilities (policymakers define programmes, allocate budgets; researchers
define themes, purchase equipment; industry looks for competitive advantages ...)
perceive different "stopping points".
                                                
 15 See e.g. Marin, B./ Mayntz, R. (1991): Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical
Considerations. Frankfurt/Main und Boulder/Colorado (Campus; Westview Press).
16 See Schön, D. / Rein, M. (1994): Frame Reflection. Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy
Controversies, New York (BasicBooks). The conditions under which this works with innovation
policymaking are discussed by Kuhlmann, S. (1998): Politikmoderation. Evaluationsverfahren in
der Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik, Baden-Baden (Nomos); Laat, B. de (1996): Scripts for
the future. Technology foresight, strategic evaluation and socio-technical networks: the confron-
tation of script-based scenarios, Amsterdam (PhD thesis).
 17 See e.g. Callon, M. (1992): The Dynamics of Techno-Economic Networks. In: Coombs, R. /
Saviotti, P. / Walsh, V. (eds.): Technological Change and Company Strategies: Economic and so-
ciological perspectives, London et al. (Academic Press Limited), 72-102
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Figure 1.2: Actors in Innovation Policy Arenas and Strategic Intelligence
 
 
 Assumption 4: Contesting and negotiating actors use money, power and information
as their main media. Various actors have different shares of these resources at their
disposal. SI tools (policy evaluation; technology foresight; technology assessment)
use in particular "information" and knowledge as negotiation medium18. Possible
variables of arena configurations are the size of arena, related policy issues (e.g.
distribution of resources; industrial; ethical/cultural), hampering or fostering insti-
tutional environments, the degree of self-organisation and of power of actors, or
established routines and traditions, and the stability of configurations. Within differ-
ent "configurations" SI activities may fulfil certain functions including
• analyses of changing innovation processes, the dynamics of changing research
systems, changing functions of public policies;
                                                
18 A related concept of policy analysis is provided by Kuhlmann, S. (1998): "Politikmoderation".
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• the identification of diverging "frames" of actors' perceptions;
• a more "objective" formulation of diverging perceptions of (even contentious)
subjects, offering appropriate indicators and information-processing mecha-
nisms;
• the organisation of mediation processes and "discourses" between contesting
actors (or between representations of their views).
Assumption 5: Is there anything specific about SI for innovation policy? Yes, re-
search and innovation are open-ended activities, throwing up novelties. Thus, the
results of R&D evaluation and the efforts on TF and TA cannot produce automati-
cally clear-cut alternatives for policymakers' decisions (for example, because of life
cycle of research issues, research groups and institutes). This is particularly, and
sometimes dramatically, visible vis-à-vis the consequences of scientific or techno-
logical breakthroughs.
How can the implications of these assumptions be taken up in innovation policy-
making? Putting it abstractly, alignment and consensus production is a precondition
for successful policymaking. Innovation policy decisions are taking place in multi-
level/multi-actor arenas and related actor networks and thus no actor can easily
make his/her own interests/objective/actions prior to those of the others. In addition,
TF, EV and TA rely on the input of experts and existing organisations and are in-
creasingly considered as tools to create alignment between actors (cf. foresight tri-
angle in which foresight methods are positioned between the three poles of exper-
tise, creativity and interaction).
Does the alignment process foster or prevent "revolutionary" decisions? Govern-
ments and others now and then try to force such decisions: examples are the Task
Forces of the EU, the Technological Centres of Excellence ("Technologische Top
Instituten”) in the Netherlands19, and probably also the UK White Paper. These are
breakthrough policies that initialise new patterns, activities, aggregations within the
innovation system, changing existing institutes or setting priorities and posteriori-
ties20. There is a paradox: the legitimisation of these breakthroughs partly comes
from the outcomes of evaluations of the performance of institutes or analyses of
national systems of innovation. Strategic Intelligence may, however, create also
broader "roadmaps" orienting actors towards a more conscious decisionmaking ex-
ceeding "conservative" alignments.
                                                
19 When initiating the idea of TTI the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands deliberately
tried to circumvent existing actors, esp. the traditional scientific organisations and give industry a
large say in the selection and management of the TTIs. However, at the time the idea had to be
made concrete more and more the TTI idea changed from a new (brick-) institute to a (network)
institute combining groups from universities, TNO and industry. It is remarkable that eventually
the Royal Academy played a key role in the selection of the institutes.
20 The idea of posteriority might be a good entry for thinking about why revolutionary decisions are
hard to make and if and how SI could contribute to such decisions.
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1.3 User Needs for Distributed Intelligence
 Summing up the assumptions sketched above, a basic presumption of this report is
that the functional acts of policymaking and decisionmaking are improved via ac-
cess to "relevant information" or "strategic intelligence". This is linked to the pre-
sumption is that "societal policy aggregation and formulation" (i.e. the total set of
policymaking activities which take place at many organisational levels within com-
plex societal structures) is enhanced if this "Strategic Intelligence" is "distributed"
around these societal structures in such a way that it can be easily accessed and used
by all or most interested parties – which includes public sector policymakers, pri-
vate sector decisionmakers and all those affected by the resultant policies and deci-
sions made by these actors. This latter presumption, however, is one that can only
be examined via a closer look at user needs for strategic and distributed intelligence.
Within complex social structures, the range of potential users of "Distributed Intel-
ligence" is as vast as the variety of needs this intelligence is meant to satisfy. These
needs also change over time. Within public policymaking circles, for example, pol-
icy has evolved from "science policy" to "science and technology policy" and lat-
terly to "innovation policy", with a corresponding shift in policy emphasis from
"science push" to "market pull" and latterly to a realisation that "variable geometry"
policy mixes are needed to "manage" complex "innovation systems". Accordingly,
the information and intelligence needs of policymakers located within these innova-
tion systems have evolved apace. Nowadays innovation systems are conceived as
complex social interactions between multiple actors, with single policy interven-
tions having multiple causes and an equally diverse set of consequences.
In such situations, choosing appropriate policy interventions is problematic and de-
pendent on a substantial degree of understanding of both likely causes and conse-
quences. Policy actors thus have an urgent need for "intelligence" which is timely,
comprehensible, relevant to their needs and of sufficient quantity and quality to
temper their decisions with a healthy dose of rationality.
To a large extent user needs for strategic intelligence are a function of their spatial,
institutional and organisational location within "innovation systems" and related
policy arenas (defined as "configurations", in section 1.2 above). The intelligence
needs of public officials setting broad S&T agendas at the level of the European
Commission, for example, are likely to be different from those within the same or-
ganisation responsible for the operational management of such programmes. Simi-
larly, the needs of these EU-level actors will differ from those responsible for na-
tional and regional S&T policies and programmes, and the needs of all public-sector
actors are likely to differ radically from those within private sector organisations
responsible for setting strategic directions for their organisations. Neither should the
needs of the general public be forgotten within increasingly participatory democratic
structures.
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Since the intelligence needs of different actors are highly specific and "localised", it
is tempting to conclude that these needs can only be satisfied via highly customised
intelligence gathering and problem-solving exercises – all differing radically from
one organisational and spatial setting to another. It is this reasoning which has led in
the past to the commissioning in different settings of many highly focused and indi-
vidualistic intelligence gathering exercises, with the choice between evaluation
(EV), Technology Foresight (TF) and Technology Assessment (TA) studies depend-
ent upon customer preferences vis-à-vis a desire either to review past actions, re-
spond to current events or to assess future options.
This practice of commissioning highly individualistic exercises has been reinforced
in the past by the influence of "disciplinary" and "cultural" factors. There has, for
example, been a tendency over the last twenty years or so for EV, TF and TA to be
conceived of as independent "disciplines" or "schools", with fairly well-defined
spheres of interest and operation. Although some conceptual links do exist between
these schools, in practice their intellectual development has tended to be along sepa-
rate tracks.
There has also been a tendency for the practices associated with the conduct of EV,
TA and TF to be culturally differentiated. It is possible, for example, to identify a
very Dutch brand of TA, and EV orientations which differ radically as one moves
from Northern to Southern Europe, with heavy emphasis in the North on "objectiv-
ity" and the production of written evaluation "outputs", and a greater emphasis in
the South on "process" aspects which encourage beneficial interchanges between
evaluators and the evaluated.
This conceptual and spatial plurality is healthy in many respects, not least because
the needs of the customers for EV, TF and TA do vary from one locality to another.
As customer needs evolve and change, however, there can be no guarantee that the
EV, TA and TF practices which emerge in one particular setting can or should re-
main the most appropriate ones to employ. We know, for example, that the needs of
customers for evaluations and other exercises change over time. In the early 1980s
there was a demand in the UK for summative evaluations, which would demon-
strate, value-for-money and satisfy the imperatives of accountability. Later in the
decade, demand grew for formative evaluations, which started to integrate evalua-
tion with strategy formulation, and currently there are some signs that the pendulum
has started to swing back with an increasing interest in "benchmarking" exercises.
As customer needs change, the practitioners of EV, TA and TF need to evolve too,
modifying methods and approaches in line with demand. There has been a tendency
in the past for many government S&T agencies to exploit indigenous expertise in
the organisation and conduct of national S&T programme evaluations. There is no
obvious reason why this should continue, however. Just as large firms look to global
markets to satisfy their needs when local suppliers fail to deliver the desired goods,
government agencies can (and have started to) look elsewhere. Agencies in Euro-
pean countries such as Sweden, Finland, Norway and Ireland, for example, regularly
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ask for evaluations to be conducted via internationally oriented "evaluation mis-
sions", i.e. evaluation exercises which tap into international sources of evaluation
and technological expertise rather than purely local sources. Provided by organisa-
tions prepared to operate globally and to draw on a vast, international pool of ex-
pertise, evaluation missions offer government agencies the chance to sample and
explore evaluation methods and approaches not always available locally.
Strongly embedded within the concept of distributed intelligence is the notion that
"localised" user needs for strategic intelligence can be best met via the adoption of
global best practice intelligence gathering methodologies21. Part of the rationale for
the ASTPP workshops was a recognition that too rigid a conceptual compartmen-
talisation of EV, TA and TF was inappropriate in this day and age, primarily be-
cause such a static construction would fail to meet the evolving needs of European
policymakers. These needs will also be ill met if "local" EV, TA and TF practitio-
ners fail to realise that "local" approaches may no longer be appropriate and that
there is a need for best practice approaches to spread from one country to another
via mechanisms such as evaluation missions.
Also implicit in the concept of distributed intelligence is the notion that the results
of specific localised exercises can be, and are increasingly recognised to be, perti-
nent to policy formulation elsewhere in the world. This is particularly so for evalua-
tion and foresight exercises. Although not central to the needs of "local" policy-
makers, the results of similar exercises in different parts of the world comprise a
valuable contextual backdrop against which the results of customised intelligence
exercises can be compared. These are precisely the user needs that can be satisfied
via the elaboration of a system architecture for distributed intelligence within Euro-
pean and global innovation systems.
For many policy actors within innovation systems, the need to access comparative
contextual data produced via the strategic intelligence exercises of others is be-
coming a necessity rather than a luxury. The complex dynamics of innovation sys-
tems in part demand a pooling and sharing of such data in order to avoid expensive
duplication of effort. The same complexity also means that there are few tried and
tested policy formulae that can be adopted and applied, with many policy initiatives
constituting risky experiments unless guided by intelligence reports concerning the
fate of similar initiatives in other parts of the world. Current user needs for strategic
intelligence may still have a strong local focus, but there is little doubt that the need
for access to a system of distributed intelligence is increasing.
                                                
21 Of course a tension exists between the need to be "close to users" and the need to make as much
use as possible of more generic knowledge. In our opinion however this doesn't provide us with
an unresolvable dilemma. It is far more a challenge for the analyst to find the right balance. This
not only for the sake of reducing costs but also in order to add value to local strategic intelligence
by placing local events and questions in a broader context.
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1.4 Basic Elements of Improved Strategic Intelligence
In the preceding sections we have
tried to demonstrate that a growing
need exists for strategic intelligence
to underpin policymaking in the area
of science, technology and innova-
tion. We have also indicated that it is
not necessary to start from scratch
when attempting to meet these needs.
In the past a whole array of instru-
ments have been developed to pro-
vide strategic intelligence. Among
the best known are the three strategic
intelligence tools discussed in detail
in this report: evaluation, foresight
and technology assessment. The use
of these tools, however, could be im-
proved considerably, as could access
to the results of exercises which em-
ploy them.
Basically there are two parallel and
complementary routes which can be
taken to improve the quality, efficiency and efficacy of strategic intelligence.
The first involves improvements in the use and deployment of existing instruments
and tools. A great deal could be gained via the further development of these instru-
ments and via their use in interesting new combinations, either with each other, e.g.
combined evaluation and foresight exercises feeding into strategy development, or,
alternatively, via comparison of the results of the parallel use of the same instru-
ments at different levels (e.g. national vs. international) or in different places (na-
tional vs. national).
That there is potential for further developing these instruments is perhaps demon-
strated by the extent of developments to date. TF and TA, for example, have
changed considerably over the last three decades, with forecasting (prediction) being
supplanted by foresight (scenario construction)22, and TA metamorphosing from an
"early warning system" into a policy instrument capable not only of identifying pos-
sible positive and negative effects, but also capable of helping actors in innovation
                                                
22 See Irvine, J. / Martin, B. (1989): Research Foresight: priority-setting in Science, Pinter Publish-
ers, London and New York.
Box 1.1: Examples of infrastructures for
distributed intelligence: Technology Arsenal
management
In his report issued in 1994 entitled ‘Technolo-
giebeleid en Economische Structuur (Technology
policy and economic structure)’ the Dutch advi-
sory Council for Science and Technology (AWT)
introduces the concept of technology arsenal
management. The AWT stresses the need for
SMEs to develop a clear strategy regarding the
products and services they want to produce and
the expertise necessary to do so. The next step
then is to look in the outside world for already
available expertise and use this expertise to de-
velop the intended new products and services. In
other words, SMEs not only should strengthen
their capacity to develop market-strategies but
also strengthen their abilities to manage the avail-
able pool of expertise in such a way that they get
access to knowledge relevant for the realisation of
their strategy. It will be obvious that following
this route is almost at right angles with the more
traditional, linear technology transfer approaches.
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processes to develop insights into the conditions necessary for the successful pro-
duction of socially desirable goods and services23.
A relatively new trend has been the development of tools which not only provide
useful strategic intelligence, but which also enhance innovation processes them-
selves by allowing the actors involved to interact in different ways. IT-supported
group decision rooms24, consensus development conferences, and platform and
scenario workshops are all examples of these new tools. In fact, the existence of this
new trend emphasises the shift from analytical to more process-oriented instru-
ments, a shift which takes into account the growing complexity of innovation sys-
tems and the need for assistance in strategy development to go beyond the provision
of empirical data on the development of new technologies.
The second route to improved strategic
intelligence leads us to the critical con-
cept of Distributed Intelligence (DI).
Underpinning this concept is the no-
tion that policymakers - and other ac-
tors involved in innovation processes –
only use or have access to a small pro-
portion of the strategic intelligence of
potential relevance to their needs, or to
the tools and resources needed to pro-
vide relevant strategic information.
These intelligence tools, resources and
outputs exist within a wide variety of
institutional settings and at many or-
ganisational levels, but are scattered all
over the globe. Consequently they are
difficult to access and use. Rectifying
this situation will thus require major
efforts to develop interfaces stimulat-
ing the accessibility of already existing
information, and to convince potential
users of the need to adopt a broader
perspective in their search for relevant
                                                
23 For an analysis of this change in relation to the shift in innovation policies from supply-oriented
towards user-oriented approaches see Smits R. / Leyten, J. / den Hertog, P. (1995): Technology
Assessment and technology policy in Europe: new concepts, new goals, new infrastructures. In:
Policy Sciences (28), 272-299.
24 For the potential role of ICT supported group decision systems in user-oriented decisionmaking
on technology see for instance Bongers, F. / Smits, R. / Geurts, J. (1999): Technology and soci-
ety: GSS-supported participatory policy analysis accepted for publication by the International
Journal of Technology Management; Breiner, S. (1997): Die Sitzung der Zukunft, Heidelberg
(Physica/Springer).
Box 1.2: Examples of infrastructures for dis-
tributed intelligence - Filiere policy in the
Alsace
A second illustration can be found in the "filiere
policy" as developed in the French region Al-
sace. The policy is geared to small (<20 em-
ployees), traditional firms and tries to motivate
firms to organise a common strategic reflection,
with the help of consultants for the preliminary
audit of the sector and then to decide for collec-
tive strategic options (and possibly also material
and immaterial infrastructures). This demon-
stration of communication and "self- organising
capacity" is a necessary precondition to get
financial support. Also this policy is an example
of what could be called "second generation
policies". Crucial element of this second gen-
eration is the focus on strengthening the strate-
gic and managerial capacities. As a conse-
quence, SMEs not only need technical expertise
but also expertise related to organisational and
marketing issues. Because this category of
SMEs does not possess the critical mass to fulfil
such functions on their own, they also should
increase their capacity to organise themselves in
strong and effective networks.
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intelligence expertise and outputs.
Consequently, the architecture and infrastructures of Distributed Intelligence must
allow access, and create inter-operability across locations and types of intelligence,
including a distribution of responsibilities with horizontal as well as vertical con-
nections, not (exclusively) hierarchical, thus also limiting the public cost of DI and
strengthening the "robustness" of its infrastructure.
Furthermore, the robustness presupposes provisions for quality assurance, thus un-
derpinning the trust in DI based debates and decisionmaking.
Having introduced two routes to stimulate and improve strategic intelligence, the
next step is to consider their operationalisation and implementation. In particular,
what kind of infrastructural requirements arise and have to be met in order to facili-
tate the use of new combinations of strategic intelligence instruments and improved
utilisation of a system of distributed intelligence.
1.5 Résumé: General Requirements for
Distributed Intelligence
Summing up and in order to justify the direction we take in this report, we have to
stipulate a number of general principles of Distributed Intelligence for complex in-
novation systems.
General requirements of Strategic Intelligence are:
• Organize mediation processes and “discourses“ between contesting actors in re-
lated policy arena
• Inject policy evaluation, foresight and TA results, also analyses of changing in-
novation processes, the dynamics of changing research systems, changing func-
tions of public policies
• Realize thereby the multiplicity of actor's values and interests
• Facilitate a more “objective” formulation of diverging perceptions by offering
appropriate indicators, analyses and information-processing mechanisms
• Create forums for interaction, negotiation and the preparation of decisions
• Respond to the political quest for democracy vis-à-vis technological choices
Since innovation policymaking occurs in multiple policy arenas on regional, na-
tional, European levels there is a need for "interfaces", linking different systems and
related policy arenas. General requirements of Improved Strategic Intelligence In-
frastructures based on Distributed Intelligence are:
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• Create an architecture of "infrastructures" for Distributed Intelligence – but no
one unique "system"!
• Link – via SI infrastructure – the existing regional, national, sectoral etc SI fa-
cilities, horizontally and vertically
• Build brokering "nodes" managing and maintaining the infrastructure
• Establish a "enabling structure" allowing free access to all SI exercises under-
taken under public auspices. Thereby the "pedigree" of information transferred
through the infrastructure must be traceable
• Offer a "directory" facilitating direct connections between relevant actors
• Define clear rules to access the infrastructure
• Make the infrastructure robust, able to survive; guarantee adequate resources
General requirements for related quality assurance mechanisms are:
• Facilitate repeated and "fresh" exercises (e.g. EV, TF, TA) and new combina-
tions of actors and levels
• Enhance and ensure professional quality of SI and DI production, including reg-
istration and accreditation of professional practitioners, and mechanisms to
stimulate renewal
Measured against these principles, the present situation, however promising devel-
opments will be shown in the following chapter 2, is not adequate. There are rea-
sons to design an improved distributed intelligence.
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2. Basic Concepts of Technology Foresight, Innovation
Policy Evaluation, Technology Assessment and Seeds
of Combined Approaches
Roughly, one can describe the basic concepts of Technology Foresight, S&T Policy
Evaluation, and Technology Assessment in the following way:
• "Technology foresight is the systematic attempt to look into the longer-term fu-
ture of science, technology, the economy and society, with the aim of identifying
the areas of strategic research and the emerging of generic technologies likely to
yield the greatest economic and social benefits"25.
• Practices of S&T policy evaluation are wide-ranging, and their functions vary
significantly (1) from the provision of legitimation for the distribution of public
money and the demonstration of adequate and effective use of the funding by
measuring the scientific/technological quality or the (potential) socio-economic
impacts, via (2) targeting and "controlling" in the sense of improved management
and "fine tuning" of S&T policy programmes, to (3) an attempt to improve trans-
parency in the rules of the game and the profusion of research funding and subsi-
dies, and to enhance the information basis for shaping S&T policies, in the sense
of a government-led "mediation" between diverging and competing interests of
various players within the S&T system26.
• Technology assessment: In very general terms, TA can be described as the an-
ticipation of impacts and feedback in order to reduce the human and social costs
of learning how to handle technology in society by trial and error. Behind this
definition, a broad array of national traditions in TA is hidden27.
On the following pages we summarise the experiences gained so far of the perform-
ance of TF, EV and TA in decisionmaking processes of S&T policies. Since the
understanding of the three analytical tools varies considerably, not only from coun-
try to country, but also from one institution to another, any attempt at a systematic
description of existing definitions and practices would far exceed the scope of the
present report. We concentrated our efforts therefore on basic experiences across
                                                
25 Martin, B. (1995): Foresight in Science and Technology. In: Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management vol. 7, no. 2, 140.
26 See e.g. Kuhlmann, S. (1997): Evaluation as a Medium of Science & Technology Policy: Recent
Developments in Germany and Beyond. In: OECD (ed.): Policy Evaluation in Innovation and
Technology, Towards Best Practices. Paris, 443-460.
27 See e.g. Schot, J. / Rip, A./ (1997): The Past and the Future of Constructive Technology Assess-
ment. In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change 54 (1996), 251-268; see also Internatio-
nal Journal of Technology Management (1996): Special Publication on Technology Assessment
(Guest editor: Denis Loveridge), Vol. 11, Nos 5/6
23
countries and institutions, while illustrating the given variety of practices and con-
texts through a number of cases.
The chapter will finally lead to the identification of some seeds of combination of
TF, EV and TA in decisionmaking processes of S&T policies, providing starting
platforms for advanced concepts of "Distributed Intelligence".
2.1 Science and Technology Foresight
Science and Technology Foresight exercises are becoming increasingly attractive
for governments, national research agencies and businesses in their efforts at coping
with increasing complexity of new technologies and decision environments, in an
increased techno-economic competition world-wide28.
TF could be presented as a new type of technology policy tool ... if it were really an
innovation. In exact terms, the newness is not the tool, but the fact that TF is done
explicitly and involves more people. The techniques existed and policymakers only
decided to (re-)use them in a situation of great needs: faced with the necessity of
making choices while confronted by increasing competition in the globalized world
of the nineties, and then starting to think in terms of division of labour for science
and technology. On the private level, during the entire post-war period, large firms
and other organisations have never ceased to use TF as an element of their strategic
management process. Now policymakers and experts of various institutions are in-
creasingly involved in a new type of policymaking mechanism and negotiation pro-
cess, supposed to facilitate the creation of consensus and commitment among them
on a large scale.
The actual uses made of TF exercises have not yet been studied and evaluated suffi-
ciently. This is one of the areas for future research in the field. Still, first hand expe-
riences of the exercises indicate many positive effects and in some cases even en-
thusiasm from those participating in the process. Nevertheless, there is a need for
thorough cost-benefit analyses because TF exercises are expensive and, especially if
large-scale consultative processes are being used, cumbersome procedures. Fur-
thermore, in some cases, national TF programmes have been performed without
enough consideration of the uses of the results and the necessary follow-up actions.
The problem at hand is that, as a cognitive creation, TF cannot be considered as a
final aim or output (in contrast to scientific discovery, for instance) and supposes
political continuity, plus commitment to implement the results in some sense.
The majority of experts consider TF essentially as a collective and consultative pro-
cess, with the process itself being equally or even more important than the outcome.
                                                
28 See the overview in e.g. Grupp, H. (1998) (ed.): Technological Forecasting & Social Change;
Special Issue on Recent National Foresight Activities, Vol. 57.
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National TF programmes are ways of obtaining opinions, conflicting or otherwise,
about future developments, most of which are already established. TF in this sense
is an essential contributor to the creation, either collectively or individually, of
models of the future. Models of the future are important because they are capable of
creating synthesis, they are disruptive and interfere with current modes of thought,
thus forming and shifting values.
Many experts are convinced (but this is not a general opinion) that gains could be
obtained if TF exercises were carried out at the European level. In particular,
smaller countries might profit from joint efforts at the European level, since the use
of large expert panels such as in the Delphi exercises is a costly and cumbersome
tool. However, even for the larger countries, the national level may not be the most
relevant context. Countries or "intermediate level" actors such as regions, which
have not yet conducted national (regional) TF exercises, could benefit from learning
the techniques in joint efforts. Care should, however, be taken not to ignore national
differences and other differences of context. This requirement would make Euro-
pean level exercises very complicated. Still, such exercises would probably be fruit-
ful provided the European level is intelligently articulated with the lower levels and,
in particular, if such exercises enrol the experience of the European TF "champi-
ons".
Examples of S&T foresight experiences:
(1) The UK Foresight Programme. The UK Foresight Programme provides
a rare example of TF becoming deeply embedded and institutionalised within
the national innovation system rather than operating only at a higher strat-
egy-making level. The Programme began in 1993, having been announced as
the centrepiece of a Government White Paper on Science, Engineering and
Technology, which itself was seeking to greatly improve the connections be-
tween the national science base and its users, notably in industry. From the
outset the TF Programme (as it was initially known) combined this objective
with that of informing priorities for public spending on science and, implic-
itly, promoting a "TF culture" more broadly.
The first cycle of the programme began in September 1993 with the appoint-
ment of a high-level Steering Committee. The pre-TF stage (to April 1994) in-
volved identifying and briefing members of the 15 panels which, together with
the Steering Committee, would be the mainstay of the programme. Panels
were drawn principally from industry, combined with academic and govern-
ment membership. Indeed, a notable feature of the Programme has been the
high level of support and participation from industry throughout. It has been
postulated that this resulted from the increasing dependence of firms upon
external sources of technology to the point where formulation of strategy,
previously an internal activity, must now at least in part be carried out in the
public arena. By collaborating in their thoughts about the future, organisa-
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tions may be better placed to anticipate the actions of their customers, suppli-
ers and others, such as regulators, who may influence the environment in
which they operate29. Efforts were made at this stage to broaden the base of
participation beyond that of regular advisers to government.
In the main stage of the TF activity, panels identified key issues and trends,
developed scenarios for their sectors and consulted widely, by means of a
Delphi survey, regional workshops and contact with other parties. The proc-
ess culminated in the production of a report by each panel and a Synthesis
Report by the Steering Committee. The latter prioritised the recommendations
of the sectoral panels in a matrix which plotted attractiveness of the potential
economic and social benefits against the feasibility of the science and tech-
nology involved, with the ability of the UK to achieve the result a key consid-
eration in both cases.
After the reports were published, the Programme entered its second phase in
which the main objective was to disseminate and act upon the results through
media, workshops, professional and trade associations, among others. Some
600 events were held and 130,000 reports disseminated. The panels were re-
tained to drive this process, though with some adjustment in terms of refer-
ence and membership. The most direct follow-up was a new funding initiative,
the TF Challenge fund, which supported 24 academic-industrial projects re-
lated to TF priorities with ECU 50 million of public funds and ECU 93 mil-
lion of private sector contributions. Existing budgets for science were also
influenced, though it is much harder to establish attribution here. An official
estimate gave 54% of Research Council spending as being aligned with TF
priorities, of which ECU 450 million was for new initiatives. Other govern-
ment departments carried forward areas relating to their own remits, for ex-
ample transport and environment.
In 1997/98 the third phase of the Programme gave top priority to the wider
engagement of business, with the top priority being to increase business par-
ticipation beyond R&D divisions to reach those involved in corporate strat-
egy, marketing and finance. This was one reason why the term technology
was dropped from the title. Other activities at this phase included efforts to
improve co-ordination across government departments and to begin prepa-
ration of a new cycle of TF activity. Both the Steering Committee and the
Panels were reconstituted as networks of implementing organisations. With
the wide range of linkages across the whole of science and innovation policy
the Foresight Programme can be said to have been re-invented as a brand
and binding agent for innovation policy in the UK.
In evaluating the successes and problems of the Programme, on the positive
side there was a clear success in attracting widespread support in industry
                                                
29 Georghiou L. (1998): The UK TF Programme, Futures, Vol.28, No.4, pp359-377
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and much of the science base. While the priorities which emerged were rather
broad, they have been generally accepted. There is a recognition that these
are priorities for follow-up action, not an attempt to second-guess scientific
creativity. The networking activities have universally been seen as beneficial
and become more prominent as an objective over time.
Problems encountered included a rather rushed time scale for Phase 1 which
inhibited the development of mature recommendations and the ability to take
full advantage of the methodologies. While the panels mostly worked well,
barriers of communication emerged between members and the rest of the
community and between the panels themselves. This has led to the conclusion
that the next cycle should have a more cross-sectoral approach and more
permeable structures. In terms of participation, there was a step change up-
wards in the numbers involved, but these still were all in the expert commu-
nity and did not include the wider public. Excessive focus on technology as a
driver led to over-emphasis on technical fix solutions relative to regulatory or
social change.
At the time of writing, proposals for a new cycle of TF activity from 1999 in-
volve several changes and developments, partly to capitalise upon experience
and partly to avoid a repetition of the previous findings. As well as the more
open structures mentioned above, it is proposed that there should be a mix-
ture of sectoral panels as before, and thematic panels on cross-cutting topics
such as the ageing population, future cities, crime control and social cohe-
sion. A further innovation is the establishment of a "knowledge pool", a pro-
fessionally managed electronic library which draws together contributions
from the community and provides a common resource. The devolved nature of
the new cycle does not include any centralised surveys, Delphi or otherwise,
though individual panels may pursue these.
(2) Foresight efforts in enterprises. One of the ASTPP workshops raised the
question: "Is there industrial need for TF and strategic technological intelli-
gence?" The answer of the participating companies was quite clear: Yes,
more than ever, since the high degree of focus in companies tends to produce
narrow thinking. The result is a lack of innovation, to the point where useful
innovations cannot be recognised. Two techniques, "scanning" and "moni-
toring", were described.  The first relates to looking for information, but not
within the limits of existing "tunnel vision". Monitoring follows trends in de-
fined frameworks that lead to practical strategies. But TF efforts are only one
of many factors of strategic decisionmaking! Furthermore, enterprises under-
stand strategic technological intelligence as an integrated bunch of various
methods and measures. There are two key requirements: (1) any TF proce-
dure should ease communication, interaction, networking, exchange of those
responsible for various elements of innovation; (2) furthermore, TF exercises
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should deploy "distorting mirrors" facilitating the creation of new combina-
tions of knowledge and experience embodied in heads or technologies.
There is no general TF model in industry. SMEs perform TF, if at all, implic-
itly, i.e. without formal procedures and explicit investments; many large cor-
porations, on the other hand, organise TF efforts rather explicitly! One
should differentiate the functions of industry-internal vs. public TF initiatives:
Industrial TF initiatives are done for survival and growth, while public ac-
tivities initiated by governments can help to create awareness, to provide le-
gitimisation for company-internally "revolutionary" discourses and for pri-
oritising of investments. Large corporations use public TF exercises as just
another information source, while SMEs tend to take advantages from it (if at
all) embedded in broader public support initiatives.
(3) Regional foresight initiatives: The Bordeaux Case. The example of Del-
phi Technopolis in the Bordeaux region shows possibilities, but also difficul-
ties of the use of TF exercises at the regional level30. As in the case of the na-
tional Delphi, where experts expressed a certain resistance to dealing with
the originally Japanese list of topics (the French national experience used the
Japanese Delphi as a model), the regional experts did not very easily ac-
cepted the national survey, because of the high proportion of topics they felt
irrelevant for their own (or the regional) context - although they had the pos-
sibility to add their own topics to the questionnaire. The experts' critique has
also been formulated in a slightly different way: "In designing the regional
Delphi, why have you not taken into account the existing local networks in-
stead of imposing such an external (understand: irrelevant) view?" Every TF
experience, by definition, builds a new network of communication and aims at
creating novel networks of actors, around new projects and new combina-
tions of existing competencies. And, by definition, it hurts existing networks.
These organised local groups will probably be involved in the subsequent
phases, for the choice and the implementation of any regional strategy of de-
velopment, but we consider it here as an advantage to start the process with a
more neutral view, coming from a higher (national) or external (foreign)
level.
The second sort of problem we want to underline in the Delphi Technopolis
experience is related to the legitimacy and/or credibility of the operator.
Shortly before the end of the project, the science park organisation Bordeaux-
Technopolis decided to link the regional Delphi with the freshly issued results
of the other large national technology survey, managed by the Ministry of In-
dustry and focusing on "critical technologies" for the French productive sys-
                                                
30 Bordeaux Technopolis/ BETA/ IERSO (1997): "Delphi Technopolis", Conseil Général de la
Gironde, Bordeaux, France
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tem. Among the reasons, we can stress the general characteristics of the lat-
ter national survey: medium-term TF in a demand-oriented approach. But the
decisive argument for adding that national survey to the regionalised TF ex-
perience was the fact that the Ministry of Industry had more credibility
(commitment to re-frame the ministry's subsidies system along the critical
technologies' grid given by the survey) than the less powerful Ministry of
Higher Education and Research responsible for the national Delphi.
Another limitation of the Delphi project is linked to the relatively weak insti-
tutional status of the operator, Bordeaux Technopolis, among the actors of
the regional scene. The follow-up of the project has been taken over by the
association of the four main actors (the Regional Council and the three local
administrations of ANVAR, DRRT, DRIRE, respectively for the National
Agency for Technological Diffusion and the Ministries of Research and of In-
dustry). Nevertheless, the catalytic function of the science park organisation
must be recognised: without its initiative, the joint initiative of the four main
actors in the science and technology regional scene would not have been set
for such a global TF procedure.
One of the general methodological conclusions that have been drawn by the
actors of that regional experience is the importance of the context. The ac-
ceptability of the whole set of items to be examined in such a survey is one
component of the context: the regional experts can be discouraged if too
many of the items are felt irrelevant to be - or only badly known. In terms of
information diffusion, and concerning the " raising awareness " function that
any form of TF procedure involves, it means  that a sort of optimal trade-off
must be reached between bringing too little and too much novelty to the ex-
perts, when translating the TF experience from the upper level to the lower
one. The second contextual aspect deals with the credibility / legitimacy of the
institution performing (directly or indirectly) the experience: it proved to be
crucial to link TF with power and commitment to act.
Summary and conclusions
(1) TF has standard methods, used for decades in public as well as private contexts.
They are still improving, and the evolution lies also in the art of combining them
adequately: Delphi, workshops, specific surveys, seminars, etc. But the newness is
more in the fact that policymakers have recently decided to use these explicit meth-
ods of TF more systematically (instead of opaque bureaucratic decision processes).
With explicit professional methods of TF, more people are involved: scientists,
managers, consultancy firms, social partners, etc. In this respect, more distributed
intelligence is enforced. Through their participation, all these various actors get in-
formation, do their own intelligence building and feed back their perceptions (and
values) into the system.
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Large explicit procedures are costly, but they improve the quality of the decision
process also in another sense: allowing the reaction of various categories of "ex-
perts", they add dimensions of TA and EV to the "pure" TF exercise.
The possible action of the EU in this domain is to diffuse information on the best
national practices and be a model by actively practising TF exercises.
(2) TF approaches are known and used by large private and public organisations.
Private corporations often develop in-house TF exercises, as part of their strategic
management process. They also participate in the large public exercises and/or they
can use public TF results in their information/decision system.
The more challenging point is the participation of SMEs, since most of them have
not the critical mass, the time or the competence to feed in or use TF information.
Thinking of the ways to involve these actors in existing TF programmes or to adapt
the tool for them is an important task to deal with. Our first ideas on that point are:
0 large diffusion of the results and interpretations of existing national/international
TF experiences;
1 developing regional TF because they are closer to the needs and competencies of
the SMEs;
2 involving consultancy firms and public agencies that play an important role in
the environment of SMEs as strategic information transmitters and processors.
 Here, the role of the EU could be to support such actions through information diffu-
sion and co-financing regional projects.
 (3) Distributed intelligence is an overarching concept of policymaking or manage-
ment. In the case of TF, it means involving a large scope of actors and levels: public
and private organisations, large and small units, national and regional institutions,
experts and citizens, bureaucracy and politics, etc.
 As an overarching political system the EU could play a specific role as a model-
creating initiator, starting with the implementation of "distributed" (in the geo-
graphical sense) intelligence. Developing a European TF programme is one possi-
ble option. One can discuss its cost/advantage ratio for the European Commission's
policymaking, its political desirability etc., but since TF is often more useful as a
collective learning process than for its final output, any common European TF ini-
tiative would have a positive impact on European integration. By developing spe-
cific TF tools, the EU plays the role of a demonstration centre and a catalyst of
communication within Europe.
 (4) It is well known that big S&T breakthroughs have often not been forecast by a
majority of experts. Some of them were nevertheless anticipated by individual
thinkers. This is a classical problem of TF and other methods of "prospection": how
to detect feeble signals or the minority views that could be revealed as the very pre-
cursors of the future? The paradoxical nature of TF tools is that they aim at two
conflicting goals: building consensus and preserving variety of visions. The specific
problem with administrative procedures is their natural bias towards selecting ma-
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jority views (risk-taking is not the philosophy of administration - private or public).
Distributed intelligence means here: combining views of heterogeneous relative
weights.
 This is a crucial issue for the EU because of, both: the size and complexity of its
institutions that make administrative procedures particularly cumbersome - the per-
manent (welcome) insistence on the need to preserve variety within Europe adding
to the necessity to keep variety of visions for all the various national contexts.
 (5) The EU already has its own TF functionality, scattered in various locations.
Some aspects are dealt with in an institution like the Institute for Prospective Tech-
nology Studies (IPTS), others are processed through the activity of several Director-
ate Generals, etc. Here, the challenge is to circulate that "distributed" information
available in European institutions in order to build real "intelligence". How to make
the activity of all the functional structures dealing with future trends in science,
technology and innovation more transparent to each other and to external observers?
Certainly, the use of advanced information and communication technologies is an
opportunity to be seized.
2.2 Innovation Policy Evaluation
 In European countries, an "evaluation culture" in S&T and innovation policies has
evolved. In most countries there is quite a well developed system of ex ante EV of
project proposals. Other forms of S&T policy EV, not yet quite as common, but
increasingly used during the last two decades include
0 ex post EV of research programmes and other policy initiatives,
1 EV of R&D centres and universities,
2 EV of R&D funding agencies.
In all these cases, EV plays a different role in decisionmaking. It is directly and in-
strumentally linked to decisions in ex ante EV of proposals. The role of EV varies
from case to case and includes, among other things, the following functions:
(1) EV may provide legitimisation for the allocation of public money to R&D.
(2) EV may enhance an adequate and effective use of funding by measuring the
scientific/technological quality or the (potential) socio-economic impact.
(3) EV may improve programme management and "fine tune" S&T policy pro-
grammes.
(4) EV may provide new ideas or legitimate already circulating ideas about
changes in R&D centres and funding agencies, thus enhancing the fulfilling of
their missions.
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(5) EV may be an attempt to improve transparency of the rules of the game of
S&T funding decisions, and
(6) enhance the information basis for S&T policies, in the sense of a government-
led ”mediation” between diverging and competing interests of various players
within the S&T system.
European countries differ in the extent to which they apply S&T policy EV. Some
countries have longer traditions of EV cultures, others are relative newcomers in
this field. In countries such as Greece, EU RTD programmes and their EV proce-
dures have stimulated S&T policy EV exercises and helped train national experts in
EV. For countries which are newcomers in the EU, the OECD has also played an
important role in diffusing models of EVs. Scandinavian countries have exchanged
models and ideas on EV as early as the 1980s in their mutual S&T policy collabora-
tion.
The following cases illustrate how EV can be embedded in strategic planning in
national research or innovation policy.
(1) The British ROAME system: In the UK, the Department of Trade and In-
dustry pioneered the ROAME process in mid 80s.  This called for the full ar-
ticulation, prior to the acceptance of a proposed programme, of the Rationale
for the programme; its main Objectives; and the means to be used to Ap-
praise project proposals, to Monitor developments and to Evaluate perform-
ance. Latterly, attempts have been made to expand the acronym to ROAME-
F, where the additional ‘F’ corresponds to a Feedback loop linking EV re-
sults into the strategy development process for new programmes.
ROAME has had the effect of embedding EV more fully into DTI's policy-
making routines. In 1990, the Department introduced a rolling 5-year plan-
ning process - known as Forward Looks - through which the internal divi-
sions outline their strategic technology-related intentions and link these to
their planned and likely programme actions. The results of programme EVs
also feed back to and inform the design of policy portfolios, thus connecting
EV with strategic planning. These feedback mechanisms provide early warn-
ings, allow mid-course corrections and enhance policy formulation for new
initiatives.
The case below illustrates three major issues, which EV processes external to the
policy "implementation structures" face the crucial role that is played by its posi-
tioning in the actual activity to be evaluated, the importance of the EV process in
the shaping of the effects of EV, and the dual embeddedness (local and global) in
the policy landscape.
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(2) The process of evaluation of universities in France - Le Conseil Na-
tional d'Evaluation: A national evaluation committee (Comité National
d'Evaluation, CNE) was created in 1984 as an answer to the growing debate
about university "performance".
CNE's "oversighting" positioning: It was created as an "independant admin-
istrative authority". Independency is guaranteed through a direct reporting to
the President of the Republic and no hierarchical connections with the Min-
istry of Higher Education and Research, as well as through the nomination
process of its members: they are nominated for four years and cannot be re-
moved. CNE as an authority has a clearly established mission - the systematic
and periodic EV of all the universities - with full responsibility for its EV pro-
gramme, its methodologies and the dissemination of its products. Finally,
CNE as an administration has its own personnel and budget covering all EV
costs. This gave CNE the time to learn: after 4 years only a fourth of French
universities had been evaluated while they now cover the whole set in the
same period of time. This also enabled CNE, by trial and error, to progres-
sively establish its present four stage process.
CNE's process: (1) The preliminary stage deals with information-gathering
and is fairly standard. Still, in many cases, this was no simple activity driving
to the first recommendation of CNE (the "urgent task to get out of opacity")
and to a first managerial effect : CNE has been active in devising what could
be qualified as the quantitative dimension of universities' annual report. (2)
The next step deals with the terms of reference of the EV, based upon a joint
discussion between CNE and the evaluated university. This is an interesting
case of institutional learning, since now that CNE has already evaluated all
universities at least once, EVs are focused on identified strategic issues
mainly linked to previous recommendations and to the objectives of the 4-
year plan each university has contracted with the Ministry. (3) The third step
is the expertise phase highlighting the three methodological problems faced
when using individual expertise. CNE mainly relies on French experts from
the universities and is thus faced with a strong problem of independency: ex-
perts are evaluating their colleagues, knowing that the situation will soon be
reversed. In order to ensure the relevance (competence, reliability) of indi-
vidual expertises, experts' reports are kept secret and memos have been pro-
duced capitalising on previous experiences. To help the production of a com-
mon view, exchanges are fostered between experts through joint meetings.
But the aggregation remains in the hands of the committee which directly
produces an analytical report based upon (confidential) experts' reports. (4)
The last step is a contradictory phase. The analytical report serves for an on-
site counter-examination with the university government. Taking reactions
into account, the conclusions and recommendations are discussed and
adopted by CNE and sent to the President of the University for an official re-
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sponse. Both make up the official CNE report which is public, printed and
widely disseminated.
CNE's dual embeddedness in the French policy landscape: The first and
foremost effects for nearly a decade  were located within universities, pro-
gressively fostering an EV culture where EV is seen as a major resource for
self-knowledge  and strategy-making. But in many cases, problems were
linked to more global issues, which CNE highlighted first in its four-year self-
assessment reports and more and more in topic-oriented reports. These have
remained near to wishful thinking until the ministry changed its policies and,
instead of global processes of allocations to all universities, entered into spe-
cific four-year contracting with each university (the so-called "contrats
d’établissement"). CNE processes and products were well-adapted to feed the
negotiation process between both parties. This points to a crucial aspect in
EV performance: EV rarely covers the whole policy, but intermediary "op-
erators" (institutions, programmes, etc.); in addition, connections between
both levels are difficult : they do not simply rely upon better, more readable
reports, they depend upon the existence of an actual arena where both "local"
and "global" actors enter into a negotiation process.
The context of EV processes influences their impact and use. There are many con-
ditions which enhance or provide obstacles to the use of EV data in policy proc-
esses. Such factors include relevance, timeliness and credibility of the EV. Also, as
the following example shows, one of the conditions which enhance the use of EV
data is the circulation and support of ideas about potential changes in the R&D sys-
tem already before the EV.
(3) Example of use of evaluation; the evaluation of the Academy of Finland
in 1992: The Academy of Finland, a research council organisation, started
evaluating fields of research in the early 80s. The quality of research was the
major EV criterion and the main method used were panels of external ex-
perts. So far the Academy has commissioned 25 EVs of research fields, insti-
tutions and research programmes. In 1992, the Academy was itself subject to
EV. At the time, after the first wave of EVs in Finland, which concerned re-
search carried out in research fields and research programmes, research in-
stitutes and research funding agencies were subject to EV.
The EV of the Academy of Finland was aimed at evaluating the suitability of
its organisation for its tasks and the extent to which it had fulfilled its mis-
sion. Before the EV, there had been an attempt to achieve organisational
change, which, however, had failed. This was an important background rea-
son for starting the EV. According to the initiative, which had failed, the
seven Research Councils were to be merged into three in the hope of in-
creasing the effectiveness of the Research Councils and in response to man-
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agement problems with an increasing number of research projects in inter-
disciplinary areas. The initiative had been blocked in Parliament for reasons
irrelevant to the major initiative. After the 1991 Parliamentary elections, the
organisational reform was given a new impetus by the Ministry of Education
which commissioned a group of foreign experts to carry out an EV of the
Academy of Finland. The EV was completed in 1992.
The EV group interviewed a large number of people actively involved in re-
search policy in Finland including members of the research councils and
their staff. In their report, the group of experts made a lot of recommenda-
tions concerning the daily functions of the Academy. With regard to the or-
ganisational reform, the EV group came to a conclusion similar to that of the
original reform initiative. Many of the minor recommendations of the EV
were taken into account in the daily activities of the Academy, for example,
increasing the size of the minimum grant. The major recommendation con-
cerning the number of Research Councils also led to organisational reform.
The number of the Research Councils was reduced, but after successful lob-
bying by the medical scientists, who managed to retain their own Research
Council, the number of the Research Councils was eventually reduced to four.
Why did the experts come to the same conclusion as those advocating the or-
ganisational reform? Obviously, they were largely dependent on the informa-
tion provided by the major players in science policy, who were, by and large,
in favour of the reform. Another factor is that merging separate Research
Councils into one large Council or into a smaller number of larger units was
a trend in the 90s – at least in the Nordic countries, which have a tradition of
following each other’s examples. The EV led to expected consequences be-
cause the major players were mobilised in favour of organisational reform
already before the EV, and the latter was used as an argument to convince
potential opposition.
In Germany, an EV procedure has been established in clinical research centres to
facilitate mediation between competing interests of various players in a national
S&T system, as follows:
(4) Evaluation as policy learning process: clinical research centres in Ger-
many. The conditions for clinical research at German university hospitals
are regarded as unfavourable and underdeveloped, in an international com-
parison. By promoting interdisciplinary clinical research centres (ICRCs),
the Federal Ministry for Education, Science, Research and Technology
(BMBF) wants to provide a lasting impetus to improve the situation. Within
the framework of a competition, eight universities were selected which estab-
lished pilot ICRCs in 1995/96. The federal funding is guaranteed for a cer-
tain time span (probably eight years), as a decreasing kick-off financing; the
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ICRCs are supposed to be funded in the mid-term mainly by their universities
and the responsible federal state government. The main targets of the BMBF
programme are: The establishment of efficient interdisciplinary clinical re-
search structures; the development of specific research profiles of the partici-
pating university hospitals, qualified scientific training conditions for young
clinical researchers; qualitative and competitive allocation of public research
funds; transparent financial management of research on the one hand and
medical care on the other.
The concept of the ICRCs grants the promoted faculties and university hos-
pitals a large degree of freedom in organisation and decisionmaking, but
combines this at the same time with demanding requirements, not only of sci-
entific performance, but also of the development of innovative and effective
management structures for clinical research.
All stakeholders in the arena of clinical research (and the evaluators) are
challenged by the fact that the majority of German medical university facul-
ties are conservative and hierarchically structured institutions that do not
have much experience - to a great extent are not even interested - in modern
interdisciplinary (i.e. clinical) research. At the same time these faculties enjoy
a high degree of autonomy. Therefore, the new ICRCs have to develop in a
rather hostile environment. The monitoring EV process is supposed to pro-
vide, from an outsider’s perspective, "objective" information on hampering
and fostering factors for the ICRC’s development. The evaluators are ex-
pected to debate this information with the ICRCs, to feed the learned results
repeatedly into the "negotiating arena" of competing and contentious actors,
thus finally helping the ICRCs to survive and to develop.
This diagnosis was the intellectual starting point of an encompassing EV ef-
fort31. In 1995/6, a multi-annual monitoring EV was started, designed as a
continuous learning and "mediation" process between ICRCs, the funding
authorities (BMBF, regional science ministries), and the independent evalu-
ators. In particular, the EV project has (1) to analyse the actual development
of the ICRCs in relation to the programme's targets, (2) to compare the
achievements of the centres against the background of their specific local
(clinical, scientific, infra-structural, financial, regulative) conditions, and (3)
to put forward recommendations for the future development of ICRCs. In
parallel, the EV team is supposed (4) to ensure an open dialogue with the
centres in order to ease the empirical analysis and to feed back the analytical
results into the ICRCs, (5) to actively support a working group of the ICRCs’
speakers and other leading representatives through information inputs, in or-
der to raise the quality and the problem orientation of the debates, and (6) to
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Policy Evaluation beyond Impact Measurement: the Case of Germany, in: Evaluation, Vol. 4, No.
2, p. 130-148
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present and discuss intermediate and final EV results regularly with all par-
ticipating actors.
Intermediary results of the (still ongoing) EV did already trigger off intense
debates within the ICRCs and in their environment (faculties, university hos-
pitals). This effect - an intense debate between the partly contentious, partly
co-operating actors on the appropriateness of structural modernisation tar-
gets and the ways to realise them - is one of the main aims of the policy pro-
gramme and of the accompanying EV.
The EU has a fairly long tradition in EV of its RTD programmes.
(5) Monitoring and Evaluation of the European Union RTD Programmes:
Since the end of the 70s the European Union stakeholders (the Commission,
the Council and the Parliament) have shown significant interest in EV. Even
before the enactment of the First R&D Framework Programme, the Commis-
sion - following an early request from the Council - approved a "Communi-
cation from the Commission to the Council on a Community Plan of Action to
the EV of Community R&D Programmes" (COM 83). Since then, EV has de-
veloped in co-evolution with RTD Framework Programmes. In the 80s and
beginning of the 90s, the European Commission has played a relevant role in
the promotion and support of capabilities for S&T EV: methodological devel-
opments and case studies were sponsored by the EC.
EV of RTD activities is established in general terms in the Treaties of the
European Union (Article 130p refers to the obligation of the EC to report an-
nually to the EP and CM) and prescribed by the joint decision of the Council
and the Parliament for the R&D Framework Programme and the specific
programmes which constitute them. The Fourth RTD Framework Programme
(1994-1998) established a new scheme for EV, simultaneously the institution-
alisation of the practice of EV of RTD programmes, consolidating an EV unit
in DG XII and allocating it to DG XII AP in charge of the Framework Pro-
gramme.
However, the momentum for RTD Programme EV has not been isolated from
the general initiatives of the European Commission. In 1994-95 the EC in-
vited a group of experts to review the existing Commission EV activities and
to recommend improvements. Following this report, and within the general
framework of what is called the "SEM 2000" initiative (Sound and Efficient
Management), an internal communication on EV was issued entitled
"Evaluation: Concrete steps toward best practice across the Commission".
This general trend has a strong financial management content because "the
results of EV of Community actions, undertaken periodically, should be taken
into account in decisions concerning budgetary allocations".
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After the document "Towards implementation of coherent monitoring and EV
of Community RTD actions" issued by CREST (1208/95, 19 May 1995) and
the SEM 2000 initiative, the Commission produced a communication on "Ex-
ternal and independent monitoring and EV of the Community activities on the
domain of RTD" (COM(96)220 final), which defines the standard practice for
EU RTD programme EV32. The EU proposal for monitoring and EV of pro-
grammes would be accomplished through two type of actions referred to the
FP and specific programmes: (1) continuous monitoring with the help of ex-
ternal independent experts and preparation of an annual report ; and (2) five
year mid-term assessment, done by external independent experts, including
the conclusions of the final EV reports of the previous FP and specific pro-
grammes. The "five-year assessment" report of the FP and its specific pro-
grammes, in addition to the comments of the Commission should be sent to
the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and European Science
Council before the presentation of the proposition for the new FP. Aspects in-
cluded in these reports are: coherence between the selection of projects, the
objectives of the programme; efficiency of the management of the pro-
gramme; etc.
These "official" EVs of RTD Framework and specific programmes involve
primarily the setting up of "panels" of independent external experts. The re-
quest of "independent" evaluators may be viewed as a way of increasing
credibility; it involves a variety of actors and pays regard to the complexity of
the decisionmaking process. In practice, S&T programme EVs are organised
with low budgets and they do not involve many people (usually 3 experts for
monitoring panels or 5 experts for mid-term five-year assessments) who are
increasingly dependent on the provision of information and support by the
EC. In addition, the independent evaluators are selected directly by the pro-
gramme management unit.
The overall approach to EV is very much linked to the programme manage-
ment and implementation assessment, that is an acceptable solution which
provides information for both, the agent (EU) and its principal (Council of
Ministers). No obligation appears to be referred in relation to the "impacts or
socio-economics effects of the S&T programmes"; however, these activities
are not forbidden, they become dependent on the entrepreneurial initiatives of
the Directorates33. Although "official" monitoring and EV panels play a role
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in assessing the functioning of the RTD Programmes and provide official in-
formation for the stakeholders' positioning, the EU continues to commission
other EV exercises - carried out by EV experts - on relevant issues for as-
sessing S&T policy.
Conclusions
(1) The European "evaluation culture", meanwhile, has a broad range of concep-
tual and methodological experiences at its disposal. Methods of various types have
been developed and utilised to determine attained or attainable effects; the most
important are34: (peer reviews, before/after comparisons, control or comparison
group approaches, a variety of quantitative and qualitative analyses etc.). These
conceptions can be carried out individually or in combination with various data and
indicators (financial expenditure on research and development, patents, economic,
social, technical indicators, publications, citations, etc.), data collection methods
(existing statistics, questionnaires, interviews, case studies, panels, etc.), data analy-
sis methods (econometric models, cost/benefit analyses, other statistical methods,
technometrics, bibliometrics, peer reviews, etc.35). All the procedures have different
strengths and weaknesses, which makes using a combination of methods advisable.
At the present stage of evaluation research, and despite all the (necessary) efforts
made to objectify the methods and the resulting indicators, we must warn against
considering quantitative indicators alone to be adequate for evaluation purposes.
The understandable desire for a tool-box of indicators which can be used in a stan-
dardised fashion is not realisable at the present stage of development of evaluation
methods, and in particular, of our knowledge of the dynamics of innovation proc-
esses: a measurable research performance and related output do not automatically
produce socio-economically effective innovations.
(2) Experience proves that any EV is faced with challenges, some related to the
methods development, others to budgetary and time limitations. In impact assess-
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ment, EV is faced with the fact that it takes many years for impact to be seen; how-
ever, those commissioning the EV seldom wish to wait for years to find out about
impact. Further, those involved in the processes might have difficulties in remem-
bering the events concerned if consulted much later. There are other methodological
challenges. Attributing effects to the initiatives to be evaluated is a basic difficulty
faced by all EV exercises. Further, indirect effects are not sufficiently taken into
account because of the difficulty in measuring them. Lastly, socio-economic effects
and contribution to societal needs are difficult and laborious to evaluate. There is a
need for new developments in methods to help such EV exercises.
(3) There have been many changes and developments in the theory and practice of
EV over the past decade or so. In particular, in countries where EV has taken root
fairly early, following trends can be observed:
0 The major rationale for EVs has shifted and evolved from a desire to legitimate
past actions and demonstrate accountability, to the need to improve understand-
ing and inform future actions.
1 Correspondingly, the issue focus of EVs has broadened away from a narrow fo-
cus on quality, economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and towards a more all en-
compassing concern with additional issues, such as the appropriateness of past
actions and a concern with performance improvement and strategy development.
2 Approaches to EV have evolved away from a purist model of "objective neutral-
ity", characterised by independent evaluators producing EV outputs containing
evidence and argument, but no recommendations; to more formative approaches
in which evaluators act as process consultants in learning exercises involving all
relevant stakeholders, providing advice and recommendations as well as inde-
pendent analysis.
3 This has led to more flexible and experimental approaches to the construction of
policy portfolios, and to even greater demands for well specified systems of
monitoring, EV and benchmarking to aid analyses and feed into strategy devel-
opment.
Many EVs thus reflect an increasing concern with the link between EV and strategy,
with an eclectic mix of methodologies used within the context of individual exer-
cises to satisfy the demands for understanding and advice. Increasing attention is
also being paid within many institutional settings to the way in which EVs can in-
form strategy.
(4) EV of the societal impact could be improved by adopting some of the proc-
esses currently used in TA where citizens are engaged in the assessment of the so-
cietal impact of various technologies.
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2.3 Technology Assessment
Technology assessment (TA), with its twin components of anticipation (of effects
and impacts) and evaluation and feedback into decisionmaking, is done in various
ways, depending on the key actors and the arenas. Three strands, each with its own
style, can be distinguished:
• A in firms and in technological institutes, oriented towards mapping future tech-
nological developments and their value to the firm or institute, and used as an
input in strategy development. "Picking the winners" (or "avoiding the losers")
used to be the overriding orientation. This strand of TA has developed relatively
independently of "public domain" TA, but links are emerging because of the
need of firms to take possible societal impacts and public acceptance into ac-
count; biotechnology is the main example at the moment (cf. also box on Con-
structive TA).
• TA for policy development and political decisionmaking about projects or broad
programmes with a strong technological component (think of the electronic su-
perhighway or modern agriculture) or important technologies (like genetic modi-
fication). One can call this "public service" TA, and consider the USA Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) as the embodiment of this type of TA. OTA has,
during its lifetime, developed a robust approach to TA studies, which can still be
followed profitably. Other TA bodies serving national parliaments and/or na-
tional governments were modelled on the OTA example, but have to attend to
their specific situation and tend to include participatory TA methods in addition
to expert- and stakeholder-based approaches.
• Agenda-building TA is the most recent strand. While it is particularly visible and
more or less institutionalised in some European countries (Denmark, the Neth-
erlands), participatory methods like consensus conferences are taken up all over
the world. De facto agenda-building TA has a longer history; for example, con-
troversies over new projects or new technologies (and the studies and documents
produced in the course of the controversy) induce learning (about potential im-
pacts) and articulation (of the value of the technology). Agenda-building TA
merges into informed consultation processes to reach agreement on the value of
new technology, as happens for instance through Sozialpartnerschaft in Austria.
The contrast between private domain TA and public domain TA seems strong, be-
cause of the difference in goals and in actors involved. The scope of private-domain
TA is less broad than in public-domain TA, but the assessments try to be more pre-
cise and their outcomes are fed back into strategy development and decisionmaking.
More recently, there is interest in involving public-domain TA experts in early
stages of the firm's innovation process, when uncertainties about the nature of the
product and its impacts are still high. In the approach of Constructive TA, private
actors are encouraged (and provided with relevant tools) to broaden the scope of
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their assessment process, already at an early stage of new product or process devel-
opment.
(1) Constructive TA36
The idea of introducing TA activities at an early stage in technology devel-
opment, and thus broadening the aspects and the actors being taken into ac-
count, was introduced in the Dutch Policy Memorandum on the Integration of
Science and Technology in Society of 1984. It has been articulated further by
mobilising insights from sociology and economics of technology – sometimes
summarised as "social shaping of technology", as in the European COST A4
Action. Constructive TA is not simply a management tool. At the micro-level,
it helps to create broader design practices. Demonstrators and societal ex-
periments (at the meso-level) are occasions for societal learning about new
technologies and (hopefully) feedback into further development and uptake.
At the macro-level, Constructive TA attempts to bridge the gap between pro-
motion and control of technology, which appears to be a feature of modern
societies: different government ministries are responsible for promotion and
control (e.g. Departments of Trade and Industry versus Departments of Envi-
ronment, and Public Health) and critical and promotional groups around
new technologies contribute to societal agenda-building through contesting
each other. While still programmatic in parts, Constructive TA has also de-
veloped generic strategies like Strategic Niche Management, and mapping
tools to anticipate the embedding of new technology in society.
In "public-domain" TA, the difference between "service" TA, with its emphasis on
reports, and "agenda-building" TA, with its emphasis on interaction, is a gradual
one. It is not always clear who should implement the "agenda" built through TA; it
is a diffuse, societal agenda on which various actors can draw. In general, the direct
impact of "public-domain" TA on science and technology policy and decisionmak-
ing need not be large. When there are controversial issues, there is more immediate
interest in TA. There are a few examples where the performance of a TA study or
exercise is required by law or by arrangements for advice (see also the box on the
French Law on nuclear waste, below).
What is shared in all three strands, and can be considered characteristic for TA, is
the dedicated effort at anticipation of effects and impacts of technologies and tech-
nological projects. This is motivated by a TA "philosophy": traditional trial-and-
error learning how to handle new technologies in society brings unnecessary human
                                                
36 See further A. Rip, Th. Misa, J.W. Schot (eds.), Managing Technology in Society. The Approach of
Constructive Technology Assessment (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), and Johan Schot and Arie
Rip, 'The Past and Future of Constructive Technology Assessment,' Technological Forecasting and
Social Change, 54 (1997) 251-268.
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and ecological costs with it, and one should try to do better by anticipating potential
impacts and feeding such insights back into decisionmaking and strategies of the
actors involved. While the three strands distinguished above fit this broad descrip-
tion, it also allows one to recognise a TA component in other activities, for example
in early warnings. Historically, the interest in an "early-warning" system was one
reason why a TA office was proposed in the USA in 1966 (by Senator Daddario);
the other reason was the need of Congress for policy-analysis support of its own.
The broad description of TA as a variety of methods and approaches to make the
TA "philosophy" operational helps to understand the relevance of the wide range of
actual TA activities, from specific impact assessment methods (which merge into
environmental and social impact assessment) to scenario-type anticipations which
stimulate public debate. TA can then be linked to democratic culture (which would
explain the high level of TA activities in North-West Europe compared with the
lower level in young democracies like Spain), and to science and technology poli-
cymaking, especially when there is interest in broader priority setting which in-
cludes evolving demand and embedding in society.
The broad description also highlights a fundamental dilemma, which has been
called the anticipation & control dilemma37. At an early stage of technology devel-
opment, the nature of the technology (and the articulation of interests) are still mal-
leable – but it is unclear what the effects and impacts will be. By the time these be-
come clear, the technology is entrenched and vested interests make it difficult to
change the technology. As with the pesticide DDT, it becomes a matter of forbid-
ding further deployment of the technology.
Recent economics and sociology of technology have traced the increasing path-
dependencies in technological development, and the co-production of impacts that
occurs at the same time. The QWERT keyboard of typewriters, but now also of
computers, is a well-known example. From the point of view of the TA "philoso-
phy" (rather than the specific methods of impact assessment), a generic TA strategy
would be to maintain some flexibility, or at least avoid irreversible path dependen-
cies. The French Law on nuclear waste handling actually embodies such a principle
(see box 2).
In this sense, technology assessment is much more an advisory than a scientific re-
search and policy-analytical activity. Increasingly, the advisory activity includes
participation, and thus becomes joint agenda-building. One can compare this shift
with the recognition, in foresight and evaluation exercises, of the importance and
effects of the process as such, rather than just the data collection and analysis.
                                                
37 Collingridge, D. (1980): The Social Control of Technology, London: Frances Pinter.
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(2)The French law on nuclear waste handling: As in many other industrial
countries, the increasing deployment of nuclear power raised the issue of nu-
clear waste. The French government opted for deep geological confinement,
and used expert advice and established, in 1979, an institute for underground
research ANDRA. When sites had to be chosen in the late 1980s, strong local
opposition emerged. So far, the story is what happened everywhere. By 1990,
however, the government changed tack: it decided on a one year moratorium,
and asked Parliament, specifically its TA office, Office d'évaluation des choix
scientifiques et technologiques, for a full review.
The office, created in 1984, is common to both chambers and, contrary to the
US OTA, gives direct responsibility to parliamentary members for conducting
projects. Sénateur Bataille adopted the US approach of public hearings of all
types of stakeholders. The Bataille Report (1990) emphasized that it was too
early to choose one solution only. Other technical solutions (transmutation
and surface storage) should be explored as well, a development period of 15
years was necessary to give each option similar chances. And to make sure
this would actually be done, it proposed a specific law -- a radically new po-
litical process for handling TA!
While the government accepted the idea of a law, it tried to avoid any binding
mechanism. In the end, the 1991 Law had strong provisions; in particular, it
included a regular TA effort.
• The15 year transitory period during which no irreversible decisions are
to be taken
• The competition between the three options is organised by having differ-
ent institutions responsible for each of them.
• There will be an annual public review of all research programmes, to be
done by a national evaluation commission under the auspices of the Office
parlementaire des choix scientifiques et technologiques.
• On each site where experiments are undertaken there will be a "local
commission for information and concertation" so that all stakeholders can
follow and debate the work-in-progress.
 What is fascinating here is how the overall philosophy of TA is given concrete
form in a structured and authoritative process. How did it work out? The
Commission nationale d'évaluation has been influential enough to forbid any
financial cut-down on one of the options (as was envisaged by the government
at one time). For the experimental sites, selected in 1993 after a broad re-
view, local commissions were created which were able to emphasize criteria
for choice like reversibility. The Commission nationale d’évaluation argued
that the traditional public enquiries for the sites (compulsory for the devel-
opment of all new infrastructures) conducted in 1997 and which were all
positive, were too limited and taking a broader perspective, proposed that
one of the sites which was not suitable should be abandoned.
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The strengths and weaknesses of technology assessment cannot be identified unam-
biguously, because of the variety in the contexts of use, and thus in goals and style.
It is clear that there is renewed interest in TA, and that this has to do with the in-
creased possibilities of combining private-domain and public-domain TA, and with
the role of TA in broader priority setting, technology roadmapping, and articulation
of views about new technology. This trend is also visible in the Fifth Framework
Programme of the European Union, where the RTD Programmes will have a social-
science component, often addressing issues of effects and impacts.
Methods of TA can be technology- and context-specific, which will improve the
chances of results being taken up in decisionmaking and actor strategies. Analysis
with the help of economics and sociology of technology offers generic insights, as
does the other main cluster of methods focussing on consultation and participatory
agenda-building.
It has been noted that technology foresight methods might be used for TA, and vice
versa. There may well be such opportunities, for example the Delphi method. The
German study, Technology at the Threshold of the 21st Century38, is a foresight
study, but indicates the relevance of extending foresight methods to TA. The experts
involved in technology foresight studies are assumed to have some feeling for the
effects and impacts of new technology, even if this is often limited to the promise of
new technology. In other words, an informal TA competence is required, which
could profit from exposure to TA methods and experience. Technology foresight
and TA can jointly contribute to (distributed) intelligence about future develop-
ments and their value. A difference in style and context will remain: Foresight aims
to open up spaces for thinking about new possibilities, TA is oriented to selecting or
at least modifying and modulating developments. The link with decisions and
strategies implies that there will be more and more broadly based contestation than
with foresight, which often remains limited to communities of experts.
 2.4 Seeds of Combination
 In order to trace potential starting points and already existing practices of an inte-
grated and coherent use of TF, TA and EV, the ASTPP network mapped the diver-
sity of the understandings, connotations, practices and uses of the three intelligence
tools across Europe. The main conclusion was that the three forms of intelligence
are still far from integrated, in terms of the issues covered, its user groups, purpose,
institutional settings, methodologies and its performers. The picture that emerged
varied from country to country, partly related to different life cycles in technology
                                                
38 Grupp, H. (ed.) (1993): Technologie am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg (Physi-
ca/Springer).
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policy planning in these countries. Section 2.4 describes the state of integration on
each of these subjects for the countries we have reviewed.
 Nevertheless, as stated in the introductory chapter, the underlying hypothesis of this
report is that the existing body of experiences with the enhanced intelligence tools
TF, TA and EV provides a basis for the development of an advanced innovation
policy "planning" approach. Elements of an integration as a basis of Distributed
intelligence (DI) for innovation policy planning may be found in different national
resp. cultural environments (section 2.4.1), different institutional settings (section
2.4.2) and as an effect of cross-border transfer of practices (section 2.4.3).
2.4.1 Elements of Integration in the Context of Different National
Cultures of Innovation Policymaking
 Mapping the current practices in the European countries, produced a varied picture
of the degree of interrelation in the practices of the three forms of intelligence.  The
members of the ASTPP network reviewed the practices in their countries addressing
a number of questions:
 Are there interrelated ”official” definitions of TF, TA or science and technology
policy EV? Answers to this question could indicate the degree to which integrated
practices have already become established. So far, we found no integrated defini-
tion, not even interrelated definitions, and in several cases not even single defini-
tions for TF, TA or EV.
 Are the issues covered by TF, TA or EV efforts deliberately interrelated? In most
countries this is normally not the case, although a number of diverse exceptions
could be found. In France, where the issues dealt with today are only loosely linked,
recent decades saw already a stronger integration. The opposite turned out in Portu-
gal, where recently some at least slightly integrated strategic intelligence approaches
where pursued.
 Do the main users of TF, TA or EV complement each other and interact? Obvi-
ously, the extent and the quality of user interaction depends on the institutional
structure and distribution of tasks between the institutions within the research sys-
tem. Besides the case of Greece where mainly one single user (the General Secre-
tariat for Research and Technology, GSRT) is a regular client of intelligence tools,
in most other countries various users - government agencies, research organisations,
industries - interact to a certain but restricted extent amongst each other in terms of
TF, TA or EV. For France there are hints that user interaction was stronger devel-
oped in the past (see below). In the United Kingdom user institutions take advan-
tages in particular from combined TFs and EV information. To a certain extent this
seems to be similar also in Spain.
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 Are the main purposes of TF, TA, and EV interrelated? In the policymaking con-
text, the main purpose of TF efforts in most countries is to structure the debate of
future options in science and technology and related policy choices. The main pur-
pose of TA is to debate the social and environmental acceptance of new technolo-
gies. The main purpose of science and technology policy EV is the legitimisation of
related policies and the achievement of learning effects. In many countries these
purposes so far are only loosely inter-linked. In Finland, the purposes followed seem
to complement each other to a certain extent (TF: identifying emerging technolo-
gies; TA: informing the users; S&T policy EV: assessing effectiveness of funding
decisions and related policies). Again, a similar picture is emerging in Portugal. As
was stated already for the users’ interaction (above), in the United Kingdom (and to
a certain extent in Spain) the purposes of TF and science and technology policy EV
seem to be complementary. In the Netherlands there is probably a certain overlap
and common understanding of the purposes of TF and (constructive) TA.
 Is there a linked institutional setting for TF, TA and EV in the sense of e.g. formal
routines? For most countries one can detect only loose institutional links; this is
mainly due to the fact that in most cases TF and in many cases TA are not institu-
tionally established while only policy EV is based on an increasingly stable institu-
tional basis. Again, France seems to have seen more strongly inter-linked institu-
tional procedures in previous decades. In Portugal and in Spain institutional routines
seem to be matched to a certain extent, at least between TF and EV.
 Are the prevailingly applied methodologies and the underlying theories of TF, TA
and EV efforts interrelated? In most countries the scientific communities in the
three areas pursue their work still rather separately (although the communities
overlap; see below). In those countries which experienced recently quite prominent
TF efforts and have at the same time a considerably well developed EV and TA
practice, one can detect a few attempts of interrelated methodological approaches
and some hints that these efforts are still emerging, e.g. in Germany and the United
Kingdom.
 Are the national key performers of TF, TA and EV linked? Although - as stated
above - methodological linkages are still only emerging, in most countries the (in-
dependent) research groups/communities carrying out TF, TA, and EV studies rep-
resent the strongest link between these three strategic intelligence tools - via per-
sonal or at least institutional identity. They represent a "natural" platform for further
conceptual and methodological integration.
 Are the resources available for TF, TA, and EV systematically matched? As a con-
sequence of the only loosely inter-linked institutional setting one can detect a
matched deployment of resources only in single cases across all countries.
 The ASTPP network does not insist that the three intelligence tools, TF, TA and EV,
should be integrated per se, yet when a combination of skills contributes to the aims
of the policy exercise at hand.  We have already discussed that the purposes for
which the three are used can vary considerably, therefore the consideration how the
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forms of DI are used should be made on a case by case manner.  There are some
general suggestions to be made.
 In some cases a combination of two forms of intelligence could provide practical
and useful insights, in other cases the policy decisionmaking process would benefit
from the combination of all three. In general the broader the potential socio-
economic impact of an emerging technology, the stronger is the case for using the
full array of available techniques for strategic intelligence.
 The following matrix (Figure 2.1) lists in what way a combination of skills could
improve the decisionmaking process by using a combination of TF, TA or EV exer-
cises.  From a distillation of current practices and experiences with the three forms
of intelligence, the matrix shows how the three approaches could serve as an input
in the policymaking decision process in a more integrated manner. In the column on
the left hand side are the main exercises as they are performed separately at this
moment. On the top row are the inputs that could be included from the other two
forms of intelligence. In general terms TF exercises can help EVs and TA, to take
into account future technological developments, which could alter the strategic per-
spectives of current S&T activities. TA can contribute by pointing towards the
needs and interests of a wider group of stakeholders, than is usually involved in the
EVs and TF studies. In addition, the experiences with guiding the social processes
of articulating needs could be used in the other two forms of intelligence. Evalua-
tion methodologies can improve the other two exercises. Perhaps even more impor-
tant, the close links between the EV performers and the policy clients can improve
the actual use of the results from TF and TA exercises.
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Figure 2.1 Combinations of the EV, TF and TA to enhance S&T decision-
making processes
 Input from:
 
 Main exer-
cise:
 Evaluation  Technology Foresight  Technology Assessment
 Evaluation  • benchmarking to
identify  potential
S&T developments
• increase strategic
dimension ex-ante EV
• contribute to appro-
priateness issues
• set the right context
for EVs
• knowledge on pro-
cesses to assess exter-
nalities and effects on
a wider set of
stakeholders
• make value issues
more explicit (bio-
technology) in EV
 Technology
Foresight
• benchmarking present
capabilities with fu-
ture developments for
SWOT analysis
• EV of TF exercises to
improve future use of
TF
• Bring TF closer to
policy clients
 • increase awareness of
social issues in pro-
spective outlooks
• anticipating social
barriers
• articulation of public
values
• avoid tunnel vision
(widen the techno-
logical context)
 Technology
Assessment
• expose problems in
S&T programme due
the lack of TA at start
• EV methodologies (as
process and tech-
niques causalities)
can improve the TA
analysis on effects
• widen the technologi-
cal context (avoid
tunnel vision)
• increase future out-
look
• expose strengths and
weaknesses S&T in-
frastructure
• expose user needs of
various stakeholders
 
 
2.4.2 Examples of the Potential for Integration in Various Institu-
tional Contexts
 Despite the variation in the use and integration of EV, TF and TA in the European
countries cases can be found which illustrate seeds of combination. These include
an integration:
• in terms of user communities: stakeholders with different positions in the inno-
vation system could learn to inter-link with each other better, using the tools of
49
one or more the three approaches. Similarly, the traditional performers of EV,
TF and TA could benefit by learning to adopt each other's approaches.
• in terms of methodologies used simultaneously: the traditional clients of the
three approaches, i.e. innovation policymakers are usually familiar with only one
of the approaches. A better understanding of the merits and pitfalls of the other
two forms of intelligence and of the benefits of combined use are vital first steps
for the emergence of an integrated Distributed Intelligence System.
• in terms of performers of the exercises: the key performers of the exercises have
a role to play in order to disseminate the understanding and experimentation
with the combined use of the three forms of intelligence.
 The following cases illustrate these seeds of combination.  The first is the case of
ADEME where in the course of time, a new approach in EV and TF practices de-
veloped by EV experts, was taken up by research practitioners and developed into a
strategic planning tool for future research implementation.  The second case de-
scribes how in Germany Delphi results were used to evaluate a research organisa-
tion. The third case describes an example how industry has used the three simulta-
neously to assess a technological opportunity which had a wide range of potential
commercial possibilities.
 
 (1) Evaluation and foresight at ADEME, the French environment and energy
agency: a sustained collaboration between practitioners and researchers:
The French environment and energy agency ADEME was established in
1992 as a merger of three former agencies: for waste management
(ANRED), for air pollution (AQA) and for (non-nuclear) energy (AFME).
ADEME’s mission is broad. It reaches from the support of research (e.g.
through a PhD scheme), to demonstration, education and local develop-
ment projects, in all areas relating to environment and energy (except those
related to water), and in virtually all economic sectors. ADEME is managed
by three ministries i.e. environment, research and industry. It receives fun-
ding directly from these ministries and through special levies and taxes, for
instance on landfill.
 ADEME does not conduct research itself, it supports other organisations to
do so. Already in the mid-1980s with its predecessor AFME, this led to the
problem how to legitimise the agency’s activities, towards the public authori-
ties.  Since research does not immediately lead to tangible or measurable re-
sults, ways had to be found to account for the activities of ADEME, and to
evaluate whether these were satisfactory.
 Therefore, in the second half of the 1980s a collaboration was established
with the Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation (CSI). Together with AFME,
CSI developed the approach of techno-economic networks to manage and
evaluate the technological research programmes.  The approach was based
50
upon the formalisation of the action of ADEME’s programme managers. It
describes the agency’s field of intervention in terms of actors and intermedi-
aries, around three main poles (Science, Technology and Market) and two
"transfer" poles (ST, TM). Hence the agency gave itself the task to stimulate
the emergence and development of networks around energy technologies, and
promote the interaction and exchange between users, developers, engineers
and scientists in such networks.  The EV of programmes became the EV of the
agency’s capability to co-construct networks.
 The methods and concepts were taken over by the new agency in 1992. A new
situation occurred: the agency moved into environmental technologies.  How-
ever, the advice of outside specialists was no longer needed: the agency had
made itself so familiar with the method that it easily extended it to include a
new pole (Regulation) and corresponding transfer poles. The use of EV and
its tools has become routine business for the agency.  EV practice has been
extended to other areas than those strictly linked to R&D.  Also, the network
approach has been adapted for use within strategy formulation.
 Finally, other research organisations in France have started to adopt the
techniques for their own strategy formulation.
 Many lessons can be learned from this experience, but in this context one
seems particularly interesting. It concerns the interplay between research
policy practitioners and social scientists, and the subsequent integration of
the tools in the daily practice of policymaking39.  The tools developed have a
strong theoretical basis (from innovation studies), but they have been con-
tinuously tested on real life situations, proposed to ADEME’s people, nour-
ished by new theoretical insights, transformed to account for new problems
the agency is faced with. This continuous interaction between various actors -
and not a linear development whereby the policy advisors develop tools and
policymakers subsequently adopt them - may explain that, after more than ten
years, the approach is fully absorbed by the agency. In fact, it has become
nearly tacit knowledge in the daily practice of ADEME’s collaborators. To-
day it serves as a general but nevertheless practical heuristic tool, no longer
only for EV per se, but, far more broadly, to organise and evaluate the
agency’s action internally. It also helps to organise the dialogue with the
relevant ministries, the beneficiaries of the agency’s support and other par-
ties involved in this field of policy.
 
 
 
                                                
39 Laat, B. de (1996): Scripts for the future. Technology foresight, strategic evaluation and socio-
technical networks: the confrontation of script-based scenarios, Amsterdam (PhD thesis)
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 (2) Using Delphi results for the evaluation of a research organisation: the
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft. Background: In 1996, the German Chancellor and
the "Ministerpräsidenten der Länder" decided to evaluate all research insti-
tutions which are jointly financed by Bund und Länder (Fraunhofer-
Gesellschaft (FhG), Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft). Main aim of the EV of these organisations is not a detailed analysis
of research performance of their units, but the assessment of the function of
these organisations in the context of the German "research landscape".
Commissions were built up in order to conduct these EVs.
 Specific evaluation task: The FhG is a semi-public contract research organi-
sation consisting of 49 quite autonomous institutes primarily active in the
field of applied technological research. One of the most important issues of
the FhG evaluation was: Which technology-related markets promise (world-
wide and national) the largest growth? Is the FhG sufficiently represented in
these markets?  Does the technological portfolio of the FhG fit with related
technological developments world-wide?
 Working Steps: To facilitate answers to the above questions, the commission
decided to use the results of the "Delphi ’98"40 Study. For 1019 out of 1070
theses of the study, an internal group of Fraunhofer employees made a rating
of FhG-competencies41. For this purpose, an index was constructed consist-
ing of three criteria which were considered to be important for the FhG: (1)
Necessity of an improvement of the research infrastructure, (2) time horizon
of realisation of a technological solution, (3) importance for the economic
development. Within 11 out of 12 sub-fields of the Delphi Study (for example,
Information and Communication Technologies), the theses were sorted ac-
cording to this index. Hereby one gained a set of figures of "important theses"
on the one hand and the FhG related competencies on the other. The Com-
mission received these figures as a crucial input to the assessment of the ade-
quacy of the given FhG portfolio.
 Lessons to be learned: Using TF Results in order to evaluate a research in-
stitution enables evaluators to get a broad impression of the fit between
world-wide developments and the portfolio of a research organisations. It is
possible – constructing an adequate index – to use the Delphi study also for
other research organisations.
                                                
 40 Cuhls, K. / Blind, K. et al. (1998): DELPHI '98 Umfrage. Studie zur globalen Entwicklung von
Wissenschaft und Technik. Edited by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Re-
search on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF). Karlsruhe (ISI)
 41 Five groups of competencies were differed: concrete projects in at least two institutes, concrete
projects in at least one institute, significant research competencies in at least one (or two) institu-
te, no concrete projects or siginificant competencies in this field.
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 (3) Foresight, TA and EV - industrial synergies: In the early 1960s the asso-
ciation between asbestos and asbestosis (lung cancer) was growing. The
medical evidence was contested by the industry, as the precise identification
of the form of asbestos that caused mesothelomia was not immediately obvi-
ous. At that time asbestos was a valuable material, notably for its fire resis-
tance and for its ability to reinforce cementitious materials, though they re-
mained brittle. It was foreseen in the early 1960s  that these difficulties for
asbestos could lead to disastrous lawsuits, particularly in the USA, and could
open business opportunities, especially for new cementitious materials. It was
natural to make an analogy with glass-reinforced plastic, but the initial ex-
periments carried out in Russia were a failure as the aggressive nature of al-
kaline setting Portland cement was not appreciated. The glass fibre used in
these experiments was rapidly degraded, causing the reinforcement to disap-
pear, leaving a very fragile cement matrix. Prospective technical analysis in-
dicated the possibility of overcoming this difficulty and this was successfully
demonstrated by the UK’s Building Research Establishment (BRE) from 1968
onwards and patents were secured. For commercial exploitation an industrial
partner was essential and at this juncture the National Research & Develop-
ment Corporation (NRDC) and Pilkington PLC came together to form a col-
laborative venture in which initially Pilkington would assume responsibility
for developing the glass fibre optimisation and production. Pilkington se-
cured appropriate rights to the use of BRE’s patents and later assumed re-
sponsibility for the commercial development of glass reinforced cement
(GRC) technology and its exploitation.
 At the earliest time in the commercial exploitation a scenario-planning exer-
cise was undertaken to set the business possibilities in their widest possible
context; this required synergy between considerable TF, prospective TA
(PTA) and prospective EV of the business. These three streams of thought
were integrated to create a series of scenarios for the business over a 20 year
time horizon. Broadly, the synergy was brought about by marrying together
qualitative and quantitative methods via systems modelling. TF focused on
the future of the business in the wider context encompassed under a mode of
thought STEEPV42. Technical developments were planned within the oppor-
tunities and constraints revealed from this wider context, to meet the foreseen
markets, regulations governing use and to secure future competitiveness of
the material, which had the unique property of quasi-ductility in a cementi-
tious material. All of the foregoing were evaluated prospectively via a com-
putable model; this was, of course, partial as many qualitative assumptions
                                                
42 Oliver, D. / Loveridge, D. / Holroyd, P. (1984): A Decade of Business Prospecting: 1971-1981 at
Pilkington's. In: Futures, June 1984, 286-301.
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had to be made on the basis of the wider systems modelling. The integration
was complete, and allowed the construction of scenarios that were both
qualitative and quantitative; these were used to direct the development of the
business, up to the time six years later when the business became part of a
larger existing operating division in the company.
 Periodic revisions were made to the scenarios as continuing TF activity re-
vealed new possibilities both favourable and unfavourable. In addition, peri-
odic major reviews were conducted by the company’s Main Board to see that
milestones were being met; this would be recognisable as real time EV in
modern parlance and periodically took the form of a full-scale business audit
comprising hearings in front of a Main Board appointed Audit Team, along
with written evidence. Post-event EV that fitted into much wider company
planning occurred much later when it was decided to dispose of the business
due to a reorientation of the company’s business directions.
2.4.3 Linkages across Geographical Borders
 Another form of seeds of combination concerns the dissemination of the EV, TF
and TA cultures across geographical borders. With the integration of the European
Communities also comes a closer integration of both policymakers and performers
of the three forms of intelligence. The European Commission has played an impor-
tant role in the encouragement of more cross-border fertilisation of good practice in
innovation policy in general and the use of policyplanning tools in particular. For
S&T policy EV, the European Commission has, in the past, proved itself more
willing than most national governments to apply experimental methodological ap-
proaches. Helpful studies were initiated in the 1980s (e.g. within the MONITOR
/SPEAR programme), that created new competencies and linkages. But since the 4th
Framework Programme, the Commission has drawn back, and the experimental
thrust wasted away. The new guidelines for EU S&T evaluation procedures put
forward by CREST (1208195) and generally based on a peer review panel-based
approach, delivers a certain quality control, but no strategic information and no link
to TF or TA results and insights (see also section 2.2).
 More EU actors have contributed to disseminating better policyplanning tools. The
case of the Regional Technology Plans presented below is an example of the Euro-
pean Commission aiming to improve the innovation policy process of regional
authorities.  Multilateral examples of exchange of ideas and practices of innovation
policy EV are illustrated by the collaboration between the Nordic countries.
 
 (1) Regional Technology Plans as inter-cultural exchange of policy plan-
ning: In 1993 the European Commission DG XVI (Regional Policy and Co-
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hesion) launched a pilot initiative called Regional Technology Plans which
was to initiate the development of a Regional Policy Strategy for Research,
Technology and Development. The projects in this initiative were to be un-
dertaken in so-called "less favoured regions" which had an Objective 1 and 2
status. European Commission officials who set up this initiative had per-
ceived a lack of policyplanning culture with many regional governments.
Particularly in the area of science and technology, no experience had been
developed, since this area had traditionally been the domain of national poli-
cymakers. Particular concern related to the top-down approach in regional
technology policy initiatives either from centralist national authorities or in-
experienced regional authorities.
 What the Commission offered was a policyplanning model which included
both an indication of the contents and a structure for the 18 months long RTP
policy process. In terms of contents the RTP prescribed a "demand driven"
analysis phase during which the "real" innovation issues in industry were in-
vestigated as a basis for policy action. In terms of process the Commission
propagated a "consensus-based" approach, where government agencies were
to involve a large group of stakeholders to discuss strengths and weaknesses
of regional innovation system, define priorities, and set out (pilot) projects.
Many public-private partnerships were established as result of the RTP proj-
ects. Seven regions entered the experimental action and went through what
was to become an ongoing S&T policyplanning process. The Commission
played a "mentor role" in the background, the regions themselves were re-
sponsible for running the RTP projects.
 One of these regions was Limburg in the Netherlands. Prior to the RTP, RTD
policy did not have high priorityin the Province and was dealt with as a side
line of mainstream economic policy. There was no explicit strategy and sub-
sidies went haphazardly to the main innovation support agencies who put
forward project proposals. The RTP set into motion a policyplanning process
which involved people from industry, intermediaries, research centres, the
regional development agency and the provincial government. The aim was to
generate a broad base of support among all those involved in developing an
innovation strategy. Outside experts were involved to conduct analyses. After
this process, which took two years, the Province had a policy strategy for
Limburg, consisting of ten priority areas and a number of pilot projects. It
also put in place an agreed "support selection mechanism" which assessed
whether new programmes and projects fit the issues set by the RTP. But most
of all it helped create a more open policy "culture" where policymakers in-
volve stakeholders in discussing and defining demand-oriented policies,
through discussion platforms, steering committees, seminars, company visits
and so on. Another result was that being part of an international network of
RTP regions, exchange of experiences with other regions resulted in longer
term international collaborations. The EV of the RTP Initiative showed that
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the general policyplanning model, first defined by the Commission and
adapted over the years, can work in very different settings, as long as the re-
gions themselves have sufficient freedom to adapt contents and process to lo-
cal conditions. It also showed that the required EV systems which were re-
quired by the Commission were hardly put into place. Difficulties in deciding
what tools and methodologies to apply, and finding the resources to operate
them were the main reasons. The RTP Initiative is now continued under the
name Regional Innovations Strategy (RIS) and Regional Innovation and
Technology Transfer Strategy (RITTS) of DG XVI and DG XIII of the Com-
mission, with more than 60 European regions going through the policyplan-
ning process.
 
(2) Transfer of Strategic Intelligence practices in the Nordic countries:
Among the Nordic countries (here especially, Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden), there is a long tradition of mutual collaboration in the con-
duct, funding and promotion of research activities. Collaboration and ex-
change of ideas include policy initiatives to support R&D activities. These
countries have diffused models of research funding and organisation to each
other.
In the early 80s, the Academy of Finland adopted a model of research
evaluation from the Swedish Research Council for Natural Sciences and
modified it somewhat. The Academy of Finland commissioned panels of
peers consisting of international experts to evaluate whole research fields -
in Sweden, the same procedure had been applied to the projects funded by
the research council and originally had been a replacement of ex post re-
ports of the projects. The main criterion of evaluation was scientific quality.
The first evaluation, that of inorganic chemistry, which used this model was
completed in Finland in 1983. Thereafter the Academy of Finland has com-
missioned 25 evaluations of research fields and research organisations us-
ing the same procedure. The Danish and Norwegian research councils
adopted the evaluation model from Finland and commissioned similar
evaluations from mid 80s onwards. The model of using an evaluation panel
consisting of peers from other countries to assess research quality was ap-
plied not only to evaluation of research fields, but also to evaluation of re-
search centres. Panels of international experts were also used to evaluate
research initiatives, such as research programmes, but in the latter as well
as in evaluation in general, evaluation criteria have increasingly included
fulfilment of broader societal missions and the strategic importance of the
activities for socio-economic development.
One of the principles adopted in evaluation in all Nordic countries relates to
the openness and public nature of evaluation. The reports produced by
evaluation panels are published and they are available to everyone inter-
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ested. This principle has its roots in the tradition of openness that can be
observed in most areas of public administration in the Nordic countries.
Publicity in evaluation is important for both the transparency of the evalua-
tion exercise and the legitimisation of the activities to be evaluated.
The Nordic countries have since adopted a wider variety of evaluation pro-
cedures; however, they still continue to apply the procedure described
above. Some of the evaluations using this procedure cover a wide range of
activities within one evaluation, such as health research in the country,
which brings about new difficulties. The use of expert panels in evaluation is
a modification of the classic peer review, which presupposes expert knowl-
edge of the research to be evaluated. The more the area to be evaluated is
expanded, the less the latter holds true for all research in the broad range of
activities.
In the Nordic countries these days, evaluation is a routine activity and ap-
plied to most public initiatives in the area of research funding, to research
programmes, research centres, and new initiatives in research and technol-
ogy support. As said above, evaluation criteria, methods and uses have
multiplied. We can conclude that the Nordic countries have developed an
evaluation culture where evaluation is one of the mechanisms by which
public accountability and transparency of public administration is being
provided. Evaluation has also evolved into a mechanism for negotiation
over changes in R&D organisation and funding.
It should also be mentioned that these countries have been influenced and
they have influenced the R&D indicator activities of the OECD, particu-
larly, in the field of R&D output indicators for the assessment of universi-
ties. The OECD was in important forum for discussion of such indicators in
the 80s.
2.4.4 Conclusions on Inter-linkages between the Three Forms of
Enhanced Intelligence Tools
 Our brief survey of existing practices and experiences with the integrated use of the
three intelligence tools for innovation policymaking TF, EV, TA in various Euro-
pean countries and the EU Commission leads us to the following conclusions:
(1) Although examples of integration between the three bodies of experiences can
be identified in several countries, there is no systematic effort, neither by policy-
makers, nor by the research practitioners, to combine the strategic intelligence
coming from the three different traditions. The synergy that could be gained by us-
ing a combination of methodologies, issues, processes and so on, is not exploited in
the most effective manner.
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(2) Industry has an older tradition of combining approaches when defining strategies
to assess uncertain (technological) developments with potentially wide impacts,
both commercial and societal.
(3) Present empirical and well-documented examples of learning from cross-border
learning show that it is valuable to learn even from different institutional settings, to
avoid repeating the mistakes and to pick up good practice experience more quickly.
(4) There is no "blue-print" of how the tools of EV, TF and TA can be best com-
bined. The configuration should be considered from case to case, depending on the
objectives and scope of the policy decisionmaking process in question. The ASTPP
network does not advocate integration per se, but an integration for those cases
where a combination of information looking back in time, looking at current
strengths and weaknesses, looking at a wide set of stakeholders and at future devel-
opments can improve the insights needed to choose between strategic options. This
also asks for further exploration of the limits of integration to avoid unnecessary
"heavy weight" exercises.
In general, we could state that the greater the potential socio-economic impact of
technology and innovation, the stronger the case is for using the full array of avail-
able techniques for strategic intelligence.
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3. Requirements for Distributed Intelligence
HAMLET. A man may fish with the worm that hath eat
of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed of that
worm.
KING. What dost thou mean by this?
HAMLET. Nothing, but to show you how a king may
go a progress through the guts of a beggar.
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, Scene 3
Top-down or bottom-up? Distributed Intelligence pervades competing kingdoms'
borders and hierarchies. Knowledge gained and used in one place – be it a promi-
nent or a less favoured one – may well be consumed and invested into the produc-
tion of better knowledge elsewhere. The infrastructures and architectures of an
emerging "digestive system" of Improved and Distributed Strategic Intelligence de-
serve a more detailed consideration, helping to shape their future development.
In the first Chapter we emphasized distributed policymaking as an important char-
acteristic of the present situation, and one which will become more important in the
future. We also underlined the variety of actors involved in innovation policy, in-
cluding the growing importance of private actors, of associations and consortia of
private actors, as well as public-private combinations.
Following this, Chapter 2 then discussed methods and best practices of enhanced
tools (ET) for strategic intelligence (SI), structured according to three types of SI,
Science and Technology Foresight (TF), Policy Evaluation (EV), and Technology
Assessment (TA). While we explored possibilities for integration, and offered con-
crete indications, we want to emphasize that there will always be much to gain from
customised exercises involving combinations and permutations of EV, TF and TA,
for all can be seen as pre-decision tools which look back to see what we can learn
from the past (EV), consider potential options for the future (TF), and examine the
implications of particular lines of action (TA).
There is also much to gain from their systematic use and exploitation in multiple
settings, with outputs accessible and distributed across actors, levels, environments
etc. The challenge we take up in this chapter is then to realise the potential and
transform the present supply into what we have called "Distributed Intelligence"
(DI) and supporting "infrastructures" of Strategic Intelligence. We put quotation
marks around "infrastructures", because these should not be designed as services in
their own right, but be derived from the functions they have to fulfill in the multi-
actor world of distributed policymaking (for example, it need not be, and probably
should not be, a separate, all-encompassing single "service", for which one institute
is responsible).
One should think in terms of an architecture, in the same way that computers have
specific architectures, which allows production and use of intelligence. With com-
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puters and networks, one speaks now also of distributed architecture. In the case of
DI, the architecture refers to its distribution over actors, levels, sources of supply
and the interlinkages, and has cognitive (nature and quality of intelligence), institu-
tional and socio-political aspects. In DI, supply and demand are linked through me-
diators, forums and facilitating intelligence "nodes", an intermediary area of spaces
and competencies, which guide and enable supply, and maintain DI so as to serve
various demands. An improved Strategic Intelligence architecture, linking various
DI infrastructures, will have to support the intermediary area, enable further distrib-
uted policymaking, and enhance its quality. By locating DI in the intermediary area
(and supporting it), we go some way in resolving the question of proprietary infor-
mation (there is some similarity with Electronic Data Interchange, where informa-
tion in one supplier-customer cluster remains proprietary to that cluster, but the or-
ganization of the information is done in the same way, enabling transfer.)
This chapter will address the challenge in three steps: firstly (section 3.1), a consid-
eration of evolving configurations in which distributed intelligence is visible, or can
be made visible through special DI infrastructures. We shall evaluate actual and
possible configurations, and identify first-round requirements.
Secondly (section 3.2), we shall assume a world in which improved Strategic Intel-
ligence infrastructures, based on ET and DI, are realised, and use the device of
writing "fictions" about future uses of DI to find out which building blocks are nec-
essary to have such a world function adequately: (section 3.2.1) an SME considering
a strategic technological move; (section 3.2.2) a region considering its new "educa-
tion, research and innovation" contracts with the nation and the EU; (section 3.2.3)
developing a new EU technology programme; (section 3.2.4) facing a new collec-
tive risk - the Ebola virus. Such speculations are necessary to transcend present-
day's user needs which may well be too conservative (and too specific).
Thirdly (section 3.3), we shall offer a draft of an architecture of an improved Stra-
tegic Intelligence. This cannot, for obvious reasons, be a definitive design and list of
building blocks, but it forces us to imagine potential future developments which will
become more concrete and specific only in the course of time.
3.1 Evolving Policy Configurations and Distributed
Intelligence
Initiating and exploiting new policy tools in a systematic fashion across innovation
systems will demand new structures, institutions, protocols and linkages within
these systems.  There is no single "correct" configuration of tools, procedures, in-
stitutions and structures which can be used in all contexts and situations.
In systems terms, intelligence is necessary for the functioning of a complex system,
and it has to have the "requisite variety". In the multi-actor and varied systems of
60
science and technology policymaking and the policy domains they address, such
intelligence must be distributed. But it must also have some coherence: be more
than outcomes of ad-hoc requests for strategic information from research organisa-
tions, consultancy bodies and science and technology scholars. And there must be
some quality assurance.
The responsibilities for provision, maintenance and quality of the intelligence will
also be distributed. One can discern elements of this already in present situations. In
our brief examples, the focus is still on national-level policy configurations, while
one could (in fact, should) argue that regions and supra-national organizations will
become more important as policy arenas, and as configurations which link up ac-
tors, including private actors and public-private interactions.
 Historically evolving policy configurations
One can identify different development paths of the application of strategic intelli-
gence tools in European research systems. In some cases, for example in France,
one can also see certain life cycles of planning approaches.
Centrally controlled planning approaches, also for science and technology, have a
long standing in the French administration. The institution of "planification" and the
"Commissariat général du Plan" had considerable influence during the 1970s and
early 1980s. Prospective, a version of TF, was an important element of national
policy planning. This whole approach lost momentum and down-cycled since the
mid 1970s. In fact, at the central governance level it almost disappeared in the early
1980s. In partial contrast, in the course of the 1980s various EV procedures were
developed and implemented, for projects, programmes and institutions, and cen-
trally as well as decentrally, at several hierarchical levels. By now, there is a strong
tendency toward decentralisation of governance, also in science and technology
policymaking. As a consequence, the competencies and spaces for the development
and use of integrated strategy policy approaches are less evident than they were.
They do survive, less visibly but sustainably, in a variety of decentralised policy-
making arenas.
Another policy & planning life cycle is seen from the mid 1980s onward in Spain
and Portugal (and to a lesser extent in Greece), induced by their entering the Euro-
pean Community at that time. They took over the experiences of the larger, industri-
alised member countries, but selectively, and adapting the models to their own cir-
cumstances. The governmental science and technology bureaucracies in Portugal
and in Spain seem to use EV procedures and TF activities (but little TA) as coordi-
nated instruments of policy planning – at least conceptually – and for funding allo-
cation decisions. The existence of the European Union, and in particular its inter-
ventions through the Structural Funds, have stimulated and strengthened this at-
tempt to modernise. One could speculate as to whether these "late comers" in S&T
policy planning will become the avantgarde of tomorrow.
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Since the early 1990s, new strategic S&T policy planning activities came up in
many European countries, driven on the one hand by the political-administrative
system calling for accountability and for strategic orientation, and on the other hand
by research institutions and intermediary bodies in search of new agendas and
fighting for their budgets.
The strong dedication of the UK TF activities to inform funding allocation and re-
search agenda building can be read as simultaneous identification and ex ante EV of
policy alternatives. The link with agendas of research organisations is clear, in par-
ticular in the case of the research councils, and special funding has been made avail-
able for research on key themes. Similar, but more open-ended approaches have
developed in the Netherlands. In Germany, integrated use of TF, TA and EV occurs,
but only within the bounds of specific policy studies. There is a growing interest in
strategic debate on future science and technology policies, which can be interpreted
as an attempt to create openings in the present distribution of roles, power, and
funding traditions in science and technology. In a similar vein, decentrally located
actors in France appear to mobilise TF, TA and EV activities to create and
strengthen future influence and power of their institutions or regions.
One conclusion that can be drawn from recent developments, highlighted by these
brief examples, is about mutual transformation or co-evolution. Intelligence has
always been a policy resource, but strategic information is now created on purpose,
and is taken up in policymaking and political strategies. Structural and institutional
settings influence both production and uptake of strategic information, and if one
takes the longer-term view, one sees that they are themselves transformed by it.
A similar point can be made about configurations at the level of the European Union
(including relations to member states). Not surprisingly, given the complexity of the
partly contradicting needs and requests of changing research systems, embedded in
multi-actor and multi-level policy-negotiating systems, the European Commission
has some difficulties in linking up systematically with the various actors and struc-
tures (and vice versa). Presently, the European Commission itself is demanding the
implementation of "professional, learning-oriented" management practices of public
action43, embedded in "reflexive" alignment procedures amongst S/T policy actors -
though the concrete planning measures suggested - e.g. an "objective" EV resp. rat-
ing of research actors throughout Europe - do still look quite mechanistic!
Nonetheless, since – as a consequence of the ongoing economic integration – a fur-
ther adaptation or aggregation (or even integration) of the various regional and na-
tional systems of innovation in Europe is at stake, there is a need for such "intelli-
gence" also on the transnational, European level (be it the European Commission or
other, new institutions of European governance): the "European level" may act as a
lead user, as well as a facilitator for other users. It is also an actor at a high level in
                                                
43 See Caracostas, P. / Muldur, U. (1998): Society, the endless frontier – A European vision of re-
search and innovation policies for the 21st century, Luxembourg/Brussels (Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities) (EUR 17655), 161ff.
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the hierarchy, with a potentially wide scope. This is an advantage, but also creates
risks of centralisation.
 A priori design requirements
In this section, we go one step further than a consideration of national and Euro-
pean-level policy configurations, and consider concrete possibilities for distributed
intelligence and a supporting service. We draw upon an earlier report (discussed in
the ASTPP Strasbourg meeting44), which outlined a DI service in which the Com-
mission of the European Communities might play a leading role. This consciously
avoided an approach with centralized and hierarchical information gathering and
management systems as these were put up on the drawing boards of old-style plan-
ners, and are to some extent the approach of national "central" intelligence agencies.
The extent of overview and policing required in such a centralised system make it
unmanageable, even if it were desirable. Key design requirements emerging were:
0 the need to take the "real" and somewhat dirty world of policymaking into ac-
count. A middle ground is created between overly rationalistic decision support
approaches, and fatalistic (or entrepreneurial) ad-hoc exploitation of opportuni-
ties.
1 the service has to be able to survive: the investments required must be made, and
continue to be made.
2 the "pedigree" of the information (concept borrowed from Funtowicz and
Ravetz, who used it as one of their quality dimensions of risk information)45
must be traceable (there are various forms of hypertext linkage which could do
this to the required degree of sophistication).
3 since the value of the information is different for the different actors and audi-
ences, additional information on values of actors, positions in strategic games etc
can be added (as in the so-called social maps used in TA), and then used to open
up two-way communication channels and/or the creation of spaces (or forums)
for interaction. Social maps, provided by analysts, are one way to enable the lat-
ter; other, more political processes may also be invoked.
There is an element of process rationalism in the elucidation of the requirements
listed above, both when provision of information on pedigree and on social maps is
presented as improvement of negotiation, and when the introduction and spread of
DI service is seen as a "good thing". The additional claim that "finally" the dilemma
                                                
44 Kuhlmann, S. / Smits, R. (1996): Some Future Options for European Science and Technology
Policy Planning. Preliminary Recommendations of the Thematic Network "Advanced Science &
Technology Policy Planning (ASTPP)" regarding the Fifth Framework Programme and the Influ-
ence of the Integration of Technology Foresight, Technology Assessment & Evaluation Proce-
dures. Proceedings of the ASTPP Workshop in Strasbourg, 16 December 1996, Stras-
bourg/Karlsruhe (Mimeo).
45 Funtowicz, S.O. / Ravetz, J.R. (1990): Uncertainty and quality in science for policy, Dordrecht
/Norwell, MA, U.S.A. (Kluwer Academic Publishers)
63
from which strategic decisionmaking suffers can be resolved is surely too ambi-
tious, but it adds a further element of rationalism.
All these good things hinge on the efforts of leading actors, which help to overcome
thresholds and barriers. While S&T policymaking may at present be severely "un-
der-intelligenced", the upfront investments in getting a DI service that is practically
useful are high, and still uncertain. A coalition of public sector actors, with perhaps
a few private actors who permit themselves a longer-term view, is probably neces-
sary to start up a DI service. At the national level, the French "Observatoire des Sci-
ences et Techniques" would be an example of such a construction (and an interest-
ing case study for our argument).
Reflecting on the initial assumptions which underpinned these requirements, we
also see that one encompassing service may not be feasible (perhaps not even desir-
able). There may well be a variety of intermediary areas, each of them served in its
own terms, but then linked (which requires translations, and some inter-operability).
There is specific, customised intelligence for actor X or Y in configuration A or B,
and there are bilateral and multi-lateral exchanges. The key point is that strategic
information always also functions as a negotiation medium, and thus becomes
shared (even while still contested), and distributed, more or less available within the
arena and to some extent also outside (requires packaging, functioning reservoir).
Such processes occur anyway, but one can support them so as to bring out the col-
lective value. For particular intermediary areas, but especially for the overall mosaic
of areas and support services, those general features which link up with the norma-
tive principles set out in the beginning of this chapter are particularly important.
This leads to further requirements of a general, process- and quality-oriented nature.
The design of DI should facilitate (see also section 1.2):
• analyses of changing innovation processes, the dynamics of changing research
systems, changing functions of public policies;
• the identification of diverging "frames" of actors’ perceptions;
• a more "objective" formulation of diverging perceptions of (even contentious)
subjects, offering appropriate indicators and information-processing mecha-
nisms;
• the organization of mediation processes and "discourses" between contesting
actors (or between representations of their views).
In the following section we present several "fictions" of elements of an Improved
Strategic Intelligence. They are presented as "short stories"; we named them "fic-
tions" and note "visions" in order to underline that they are they are deliberately
constructed and speculative, based on the assumption that creative forward thinking
may stimulate the design of related architectures.
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3.2  Stylized Fictions
The objective of these stylized fictions is to take "classical" problems encountered
today and suggest in which ways an architecture of Improved Strategic Intelligence
– based on "Distributed Intelligence" and active "interfaces" – would help actors in
various innovation policy arenas in their decisionmaking processes.
The speculatively narrated situations below aim thus at highlighting processes, is-
sues … and risks. Each fiction is followed by comments highlighting specific di-
mensions of the global architecture. These will help in further articulating "infra-
structures" needed for this architecture of distributed policymaking and intelligence
to exist.
3.2.1 Fiction 1: An SME Considering a Strategic Technological Move
It is the year 2005.
The managing director of Biomat had a problem. Her firm had spun out of the
European Advanced Study Institute to build replacement human organs using
metagenic technology. With the support of regional governments, the com-
pany had won key clients in the health sector and now employed 50 people–
equivalents based at its two sites in Ibiza and Rotterdam. After two years of
success, Biomat was at a crossroads. Should it stick to metagenics which was
costly and prone to production problems, or should it move into the newly
emergent ultragenic approaches which promised great cost reductions but
were unproven?
In her early career, the Biomat manager had avoided government advice and
schemes after some bad experiences of their limited knowledge of the bioparts
sector. The R&D programmes always seemed to favor the strongest lobbies
and had made some spectacular wrong decisions. Happily, things had got
much better since the launch of the ENDBITS, the European Network of Dis-
tributedBureaux of Intelligence for Technology. She switched on her video-
phone and asked it to trace the head of the regional innovation bureau, the
RIB …
RIB helped her to prepare a videonote on which technology to choose. It ran
a standard search on the European Foresight Bank, an electronic tool which
logged all of the world's foresight outputs and used AI algorithms to cluster
their findings and build scenarios. The recent expert assessments from Ger-
many, Greece and Korea all looked good for ultragenics. It seemed feasible
and the inter-related technologies were in place. The RIB advised that for
health technologies, it was insufficient to rely upon only foresight views –
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however positive. Social and regulatory problems were also possible and the
adviser had heard of some problems in Austria. The TA directory identified
the main Austrian experts and RIB contacted them. The reply confirmed their
suspicions. Ultragenics had been subject to ethical challenges from a local
religious foundation who were organising a boycott. RIB called for more in-
formation and scanned the recordings of the Consensus Conference. Relief!
The objections were based on a misunderstanding of the procedures for ultra-
genics (which unlike earlier approaches did not depend upon foetal cells) and
the citizens jury had come out in favour, subject to certain restrictions.
Biomat was ready to launch its ultragenics research programme, but was
worried about the cost. The RIB pointed out that all three of the European Re-
search Framework Programme agencies offered support in this field. In this
case, they advised joining the programme headquartered in Prague, as a re-
cent evaluation had shown it provided the fastest turnaround of proposals and
claims, and hence had attracted a higher quality of potential partners. The
programme was also a direct result of one of the foresight programmes they
had just consulted.
"Thanks RIB" said the Biomat manager. "Life without ENDBITS just wouldn't
be the same."
Comments on fiction 1: Fiction 1 presupposes the existence of three common resp.
global "infra-structural" elements: a TF data bank, a TA directory and a network of
"trustworthy" innovation bureaus. Let us further analyze these components, since
they help in identifying three crucial requirements for enhanced DI to exist.
a) There has been a generalisation of TF exercises as a normal instrument to prepare
for future actions. Since activities and specialisation differ from "place" to "place",
many TF exercises have taken place or are taking place. The need progressively
arose for a "enabling structure" which would allow free access to all the exercises
undertaken under public auspices. It is well known (see Chapter 2) that such exer-
cises have a double dimension, that of identified shared anticipations between "ex-
perts" and to foster linkages, interactions and shared visions within given commu-
nities. This second objective of course remains "local" i.e. linked to the places
which developed the different TF exercises. Still, being supported by public funds,
it was considered that a better use of public funds could be achieved if at least ele-
ments of the first dimensions (i.e. results about anticipations) could be accessible
for other exercises and the public at large. This gave rise to a joint decision at the
EU level to support such a "service". The only thing we know here about this serv-
ice is that it takes the form of a bank which stores results from most world exercises
undertaken. We can hypothesize three further elements :
0 the need for a central team to manage and maintain the service. For this, it is not
necessary to think of a European institution, we can also think of a delegation to
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a specialized company or to a joint undertaking of public institutions specialising
in technology studies, or TF work.
1 the need for rules to access it, for instance, the need for users to become ac-
knowledged customers and different tariffs for access depending on the type of
customer, a large firm with internal capabilities, an "intermediary" such as the
above mentioned innovation bureau, or political stakeholders such as local or re-
gional authorities, recognised non-governmental organisations, chambers of
commerce or professional associations.
2 the need for adequate resources, and there one could think of a policy whereby
basic "core funding" allocated by EC would reduce over time, the service aiming
at being self-sustained once initial investments in the development of the bank
have been paid for.
b) The fiction highlights a second feature, the existence and role of regional "inno-
vation bureaux" and a related European network (ENDBITS). Their existence re-
veals an understated assumption which is that, if most large organisations have their
in-house capabilities, such is not the case for small entities, however "front tech"
they might be, hence the development by a large majority of regions of Innovation
Bureaux. The terminology is deliberately disconnected from the existing structures
which often only highlight technological dimensions of mediation, such as technol-
ogy resource centres for instance.
The example also assumes a great trust in the capabilities of such "intermediary
structures". How can it be the case, especially if the number of innovation bureaux
is such that, within a federation like the EU, you probably have more than 500 …
One can hypothesize the existence of a European association which has gone further
than the sole identification of good practices and has developed an "accreditation
office" based on the adoption of agreed standards of quality and in charge of label-
ling local innovation bureaus (and of monitoring/evaluating their performance).
What is underlined here, is the need for quality assurance, and the fact that self-
organising mechanisms can be as powerful as top-down regulatory approaches. It
also leaves room for a plurality of local institutional arrangements for such innova-
tion bureaus.
c) Finally, Fiction 1 also considers technology as part of societal issues and thus
subject to political debates with "consensus conferences" as a normal process for
addressing ethical issues. So that, as for TF, the need for a central structure taking
hold of all TA debates and especially of all "consensus conferences" has also been
recognised. But it is of a different nature than the TF one. In the TF case, the bank
capitalises "results", i.e. anticipations made on potential technologies. For TA, it has
been considered that this is not enough. Information could be easily gathered in each
TA exercise about the issue addressed, the compromise arrived at, the promoter and
main actors of the exercise, still this would remain of limited interest since the most
relevant elements were specific to each TA and very difficult to gather in a data
bank, especially positions taken by given stakeholders and the way they evolved
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over time, elements which proved crucial in the compromise arrived at, the potenti-
ality of transportability or generalisation of the compromise arrived at, etc. Thus the
choice of a "directory", the role of which is to enable direct connections between
relevant actors.
Again, nothing is said here about the conditions under which such a directory oper-
ates. Many options could be open, and why not one where this is developed under
the auspices of the European association of parliamentary "technology assessment
offices” (which exist in all EU national parliaments, whatever their specific termi-
nology in each country, and even have been established in certain regions) …
3.2.2 Fiction 2: A Region Considering its New "Education, Research
and Innovation" Contracts with the Nation and the EU
February 13th 2007:
Meeting of the Economic and Social Council of Region X.
The object of the meeting was to deal with the renewal at the end of 2008 of
the "EU-Region" and "Nation-Region" five year contracts dealing with edu-
cation, research and innovation policy. This will be the first time such con-
tracts are negotiated together and coordinated. The issue of the meeting was
to decide how to prepare this negotiation due to start exactly in one year, and
more specifically how to evaluate and put in perspective the set of regional
projects looking for joint funding. These projects, which the council was pres-
ently receiving, covered a wide range of activities: scientific equipment and
infrastructures for public labs, industrial facilities for testing specific innova-
tive products or processes, training programmes linking firms and university
departments, virtual libraries in specialized domains. More than half of them
are continuations, having already been funded under the previous (and still
on-going) contracts.
Two points were considered central for the regional proposal to be "robust".
(1) Half of the projects being continuations, evaluation was a first important
element. The classical "expert evaluation of projects' achievements", as re-
quired by both contracts, was not judged sufficient, so the council decided to
undertake an evaluation of socio-economic effects of funded projects. This de-
cision was largely influenced by the President who had just returned from the
annual conference of presidents of regional Economic & Social Councils,
where a full day, organised by the "European Association of Evaluators", was
devoted to "best practices in programme evaluation". He learned there that
methods were now considered reliable even for evaluating effects of research
infrastructures or teaching programmes, two central features of the regional
programme. He also had been very much impressed by the accreditation pro-
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cedure which was in use and showed that within his own region and the
neighbouring ones, at least six entities were accredited, rendering it feasible
to have results within a six month period.
(2) A second important debate dealt with the wide spread of projects received.
Could the region present such a patchwork for negotiation? Or should not
there be a clear expression of the region's objectives and directions? Finally,
after a quite confusing debate, an agreement was reached about the focusing
of the region's objectives. But, faced with opposite views, the council only
agreed on two main criteria: the region should focus on "promising scientific
and/or technological fields" and at the same time theses should favour the de-
velopment of "technology districts", a fashionable notion which had sprung
from the successful "filière" approach developed these last years in quite a
few regions such as Alsace. It was thus decided that the regional innovation
bureau (which had been created three years ago both to manage projects and
develop technology transfer) would be in charge of making a proposal for the
next session in two weeks time.
February 15th: Meeting of the board of the innovation bureau. The objective
is to prepare a proposal to the council. Very rapidly members arrive at the
conclusion that only a foresight exercise will help in assessing these areas
where there is both a regional potential and a will to develop joint activities.
It is also rapidly agreed that, due to the short time left, account must be taken
of already existing work. A review is requested from the head of the bureau.
February 22nd: Meeting of the board of the innovation bureau. The Chair-
man of the Board confirmed the agreement of the President of the Council to
undertake a foresight exercise. The head of the bureau then presented the re-
sults of his enquiries. First, mobilizing the recent regional innovation survey,
he suggested limiting the scope to seven areas where there were at least 10
innovating companies and 5 public research groups. From what he had been
told by the secretariat of the council, this corresponded quite well to the ma-
jor projects received (especially for scientific equipment and training). This
was agreed upon, but it was also said that the innovation bureau would plead
for room to be left for innovative, exploratory projects not within these seven
areas, a figure of 20% of the funds asked for, would be suggested to the coun-
cil.
His further enquiries into the European TF bank had shown the head of the
bureau that, though results were accessible, the situation differed depending
upon the area. In 5 of the 7 areas, two very different types of foresight had
been undertaken: on the one hand, there were the results of the last joint
German-UK Delphi enquiry which he considered in each field too general,
"science pushed", and long-term-oriented; on the other hand there was the
recent national survey on "critical technologies" for the nation, which was
shorter term, more specific and, even in some areas probably too specific. It
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was decided that account should be taken of both and the proposal was to
very rapidly devise a "one round" questionnaire as the source for further
workshops aiming at a "common vision" and thus at a revised more articu-
lated set of projects.
But enquiries had also shown that in cotton-based textiles and ferrous metal-
lurgy, no such exercise had been recently conducted, thus a fresh approach
was needed if only to identify potential scientific and technological break-
through. Here, it was felt necessary to trespass the borders of the region and
to see whether a larger professional exercise could be organised. The chair-
man of the board was charged to enquire into the issue further.
February 28th: Meeting of the Economic & Social Council of Region X. The
terms of reference for the future evaluation presented by the "project moni-
toring bureau" of the council are rapidly agreed upon. The agreement for a
Delphi exercise focused on the 7 areas is also confirmed. As suggested by the
chairman of the innovation bureau, the latter is directly in charge of the 5 ar-
eas while the council agrees to fund half of the costs of the professional fore-
sight exercises to be undertaken by two specialised technology resource cen-
tres, the professional associations having agreed in principle to fund the other
half. The council also requires the two associations to commit themselves be-
fore the end of March, otherwise the bureau will have to devise another ap-
proach.
Comments on fiction 2: As fiction 1, but in a different setting, this fiction requires
the existence of common "resources" local policy arenas can draw upon. We find
here again the Foresight bank, and at the same time, fiction 2 makes it clear that it
would not be realistic to think that some all embracing exercises can be enough to
feed it. This is an endless process, not only because it has to be periodically re-
peated, but also because coverage of all activities and all areas of knowledge cannot
be imagined and will thus always require "fresh" exercises and renewed combina-
tions of actors and levels, as exemplified here by the two areas not covered in sup-
posedly "older" fields.
The reader will also notice that trust in the innovation bureau is quite high, no doubt
due to the accreditation mechanism pointed out in fiction 1.
The third element this second fiction highlights is a central phenomenon in public
research management, the generalisation of EVs and the corresponding emergence
of a strong professional association. This has not only developed, as for innovation
bureaus, an accreditation mechanism, but is also heavily engaged in disseminating
knowledge about it (as witnessed by the session organised for regional presidents of
"economic & social" councils). Of course, other directions could have been taken,
for instance, pushing towards a public label (as was the case e.g. in France for con-
sultants in energy saving by the national agency in charge of the related issue).
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However, this seemed difficult to imagine taking into account the lasting debate
upon public organisation of EV and the difficulties encountered in the 1990s for
promoting European co-operation between bodies, services and others in charge of
EV in the different EU countries.
The final point this fiction illustrates is an important message for this report. En-
hancement of "instruments" (as is witnessed here for EV) and of "distributed intel-
ligence" (as is enabled for instance by the TF bank) should not be confused with
"improved strategic intelligence". Fiction 2 gives an account of this latter process,
whereby, thanks to the new "infrastructure" developed, locally rooted decisionmak-
ing processes can be enhanced, thanks to the specific shaping and gathering of the
intelligence required by the specific situation faced.
3.2.3 Fiction 3: Developing a New EU Technology Programme
September 2007.
The newly established "Joint Office for socio-technological programmes"
between the European Commission and the European Parliament is under
multiple pressures. The Office is the result of new procedures adopted for the
Sixth Research Framework Programme of the European Union (FP6). No
clear pattern for putting a problem on the political agenda has yet emerged
while candidate actions multiply to get hold of the billions of Euros that are
still pending!
It is true that major Technology Foresight exercises are held every five years
(if only to please the Japanese), and these produce listings of promising tech-
nologies. The 2006, UK-led Foresight exercise, as well as the parallel Japa-
nese Delphi Foresight, have identified new solid-state technologies which al-
low much higher conversion rates of solar to electrical energy. This creates
new possibilities for centralised solar energy power plants. The Office is par-
ticularly keen to pursue this lead, and perhaps establish a development and
demonstration programme, one reason being the disarray of the nuclear
power programme, even in France. Quite a number of countries have passed
laws against recycling nuclear waste. The French Parliament prolonged the
"search" period during which no irreversible solution is to be taken from
2006 until 2015, and the technically favoured option, incineration by a "rub-
biatron”, faces strong opposition from citizens of the area where the test bed
is supposed to be located. A European consensus conference about nuclear
waste transportation ended in  confusion, rather than agreement.
Alternative ways of providing electrical power should be developed, and be
part of the portfolio of RTD programmes. The Office prepares itself well by
inviting C2, the Consultancy Consortium, to prepare a background report on
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the new solid-state technology for solar power and its societal impacts. The
Consultancy Consortium, established since 2005, led by the respected con-
sultancy firm John D. Big, pools the dedicated TA and TF studies of its mem-
bers (which include the consultancy arms of some major research universi-
ties). The data remain confidential, and the Consortium charges a fee for de-
livering analyses based on them. An important feature of the Consortium is
that they recognise a civic duty to deliver such analyses with the public inter-
est in mind. This rule allowed the universities to come in, and shifted the role
of the Consortium from that of a self-interested actor to a node in the network.
Members of the Consortium profited from their access to this clearing house,
as well as from the status membership conferred (even if they had to accept
the obligations that went with it).
The action of the Office coincided with the publication, by the Association of
Mediterranean Regions, of a study of solar energy options and critical issues,
which ended up privileging "centralised thermal solar" as the most promising
solution. As environmental groups, criticising the required concentration of
mirrors for transforming the last untouched landscapes of the Mediterranean
zone, were quick to point out, at least one of the champions for these plans
was member of the Joint Office. Whether the coincidence was indeed a case of
lobbying was not clear, but the suggestion added force to their general argu-
ment that major public investments should be postponed until the new tech-
nology has proven its efficacy, its reliability and demonstrated cost-
effectiveness.
While the Office awaited the report of the Consultative Consortium, it real-
ised that it needed further, independent inputs to overcome a possible stale-
mate between proponents and opponents. In Europe, there was no equivalent
to the advisory activities of the USA Academy of Sciences. There had been
attempts to shift or extend the make-up of the European Science Foundation
in such a direction, but even if this had been successful, there would still be
the connotation of a scientific establishment, which would create problems –
as had happened with the advice of the USA Academy of Sciences. Staff in the
Office suggested to use the Delphi Foresight exercise, with its broad consul-
tation, to identify relevant experts. Some regions in Europe had exploited
Delphi exercises for such a purpose, and this could be repeated at the Euro-
pean level. While the proposition was attractive, it was necessary to have
some quality assurance, over and above the value of the arguments put for-
ward. Of course, there was the Repository of R&D Evaluations, set up by the
European Universities’ Rectors Conference, which would allow one to posi-
tion academic experts. The Office was confronted with a dilemma: whether to
go for recognised expertise, as evidenced by membership (and status) in pro-
fessional societies and by scores in research assessment exercises, with the
risk of being accused of an establishment bias; or open up to all comers, but
then have to develop and apply quality criteria of its own.
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The Office opted to overcome the dilemma in the short term by setting up an
RTD programming version of consensus conferences. (It took care of the long
term issues also by putting pressure on the European Science Foundation,
Academies of Science, and Institutes of Advanced Study to devise an open-
ended quality assurance system.) The conferences were exciting events for the
participants, not in the least because of new information and communication
technologies: whizz-kids from Big Heart Company introduced comic strip
balloons offering URL linkages to key words as well as to experts speaking
out, which allowed all participants to contextualize what was being intro-
duced.
The programme proposed to European Council and European Parliament is
novel in two ways. One, it is not a finished programme, but linked to ongoing
activities of actual and prospective participants. Two, as a programme, it is
implemented in two stages. There is a framework for articulation and imple-
mentation of programme goals. And secondly, there is implementation of the
programme, in this case delegated to other actors, like the Association of
Mediterranean regions which has been very active in organising consensus
conferences in all regions.
Comments on fiction 3: This third fiction takes hold of the elements mentioned be-
fore: actors normally mobilize in their argumentation the results of different TF and
TA exercises which have taken place to position better the new option they propose.
When faced with "scientific" evaluations, policy actors are rarely equipped to un-
dertake it internally (this is strongly underlined in chapter 2) and thus need to dele-
gate it to external "bodies". Here we have moved from the dominating present fea-
ture where "ad hoc committees" are created, to delegation to "reliable" and "credi-
ble" actors, including a private-public partnership like the mentioned Consultancy
Consortium C2, in charge of organising an adequate EV process. Alternative "infra-
structures" for the global DI architecture could have been thought of, such as Euro-
pean associations of learned societies, or a European gathering of academies of sci-
ence.
This third fiction highlights another central phenomenon: without an evolution of
present decisionmaking processes, there is no need for more to be done than just
enhancing present practices. The fiction first takes for granted a feature put forward
in chapter one: the locus for innovation policymaking has dramatically enlarged: it
is no longer the sole realm of national governments, with some "issues" delegated to
a marginal EU framework programme. Regional policies have multiplied (as illus-
trated by fiction 2) and are by then fully fledged policy actors. Some even consider
that certain Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) addressing given problems
(such as neuromuscular diseases or cystic fibrosis – to take existing examples) also
play a similar role. Thus articulation between "policy arenas" is a central issue in the
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way to handle problems: in this fiction, "exploration" has been the initiative of an
association of regions (which is different from a nation!), because they recognised
the issue the project proposes to solve, as critical for them. It is not difficult to hy-
pothesize that in a European Union made of 25 countries and probably over 150
regions, such assemblages will be the rule rather than the exception - what will then
be the capability of a problem to be shared by all political levels?
3.2.4 Fiction 4: Facing a New Collective Risk: the Ebola Virus
Sister Francesca felt ill, more so than at any time in her 20 years of working
in the remote areas of Central Africa. It had started suddenly and after 48
hours her compatriots had concluded that a quick return to the Convent, on
the outskirts of Paris, was imperative.
The flight seemed interminable; to take off from Kinshasa at 25 minutes past
midnight was bad enough, but the trudge through Brussels airport in eight
hours time, to get the flight to Paris, would take all her courage. The food
hadn't interested her. To make matters worse she had broken her wine glass,
cutting her hand in the process. The stewardess had been kind, but Francesca
wondered how the stewardess must have felt when she cut her own hand on
the broken glass, which was liberally spattered with Francesca's blood.
Far away now in Africa a phone call had been made to Mother Superior in
Paris, who had later telephoned the Convent's doctor. Dr. Louise Estaer pon-
dered on that phone call; a nursing nun travelling home to Paris from Central
Africa by a scheduled flight and with a high fever? Thoughts flitted through
her mind, but she decided to wait until she saw Francesca. She called Mother
Superior to accompany her. Both didn't like what they saw. After bringing
Francesca back to the convent, Dr. Estaer consulted a colleague with African
experience as a member of Medecins sans Frontières. Following his advice,
Dr. Estaer immediately telephoned the US Center for Disease Control, in At-
lanta. It took some effort to get past the "front desk" bureaucracy, but quiet
forcefulness got her to the right office. Her story was listened to with pa-
tience. The advice was firm: blood samples to Atlanta and patient isolation
were an essential precaution; a few hours would tell whether she had Ebola
fever.
Three weeks later Dr Estaer was presenting the elements she had gathered to
the sub-group on new viruses of the French commission of health safety46. The
blood samples had confirmed an Ebola type virus. The nun had died horribly.
                                                
46 We remain here "traditional" in supposing face-to-face relations. One could easily replace that by
a virtual meeting …
74
The nurse, who had clumsily managed to jab herself with the syringe after
taking the blood sample, was fighting for her life after one of the few Euro-
pean survivors of Ebola, an Englishman, had been tracked down to enable se-
rum to be prepared from his blood. Three days ago, Dr. Estaer had been
contacted by the US Center for Disease Control, which had located the same
virus on another person in Belgium. It did not take long to find out, with the
help of the company's doctor, that this was the blood of the air stewardess,
who had been infected during Francesca's wine glass accident: she had died
in the small Belgian town of Ninove, with symptoms that had baffled the local
doctors until, under the advice of another NGO, they had contacted Atlanta
and sent them a post-mortem sample. And yesterday, she had been called
upon by a Parisian hospital to see a patient just admitted, who had returned
from a Central African safari holiday five days ago and was running a high
fever with some unusual symptoms.
These elements had prompted her to ask for an emergency meeting of the sub-
group. At the end of her presentation, the questions multiplied: Was Ebola,
which everybody thought extinct, back? Or were we facing a new type of vi-
rus? Could the virus mutate to survive in Europe? Could it find a natural host
in Europe (the African host of Ebola had never been positively identified)?
Could the climate in some region of Europe become benign to a host for the
virus without its mutation? But also, how could a very sick person travel un-
suspectingly on a long-haul scheduled flight?
The conclusions of the sub-group were clear-cut. It was out of the question to
wait any longer. Sanitary authorities should be warned so that emergency ac-
tions could be organised to monitor movements from that African region and
the situation of all those which had returned in the last three months. The
emergency sanitary net, created under the auspices of the G8, three years
ago, was immediately activated.
At the same time, the "Dormont" scientific committee (called after the name of
the first president of its predecessor which was created to cope with the BSE
crisis) was informed. A video conference was organised the following day
with its sister Belgian committee, examining evidence … and the following
week, they proposed the European health research committee create an ad-
hoc group in charge of monitoring the potential development of the disease
and of engaging a research action. The procedure for getting funds out of the
"European health emergency research fund" was engaged while the associa-
tion of health research institutions was asked to organize a dedicated team.
Comments on fiction 4: This last fiction plays a different role. It is no longer to
highlight the "infrastructure" needed for a DI architecture, but the fact that no one
unique "system" can be relevant. "Intelligence" required is embedded in the situa-
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tions it addresses. Thus numerous forms of aggregation, from the local to the global
level, will take place, many of which will not separate different forms of public ac-
tion (S&T being one among others).
Fiction 4 describes one such configuration, linked to a central public issue, health. It
highlights another type of "distributed intelligence", based upon the capability to
react to unexpected, i.e. uncertain, situations/events. The configuration proposed
builds upon the existence of distributed knowledge – in this case, it is a "local"
practitioner, a generalist, that puts facts together – but instead of pondering alone,
she is able to emit a warning because "intermediaries" have been established for
such situations of crisis – here the "sub-group on new viruses of the French com-
mission of health safety". That we imagine a solution for handling immediate ac-
tion, is not central to the purpose of the fiction (apart form highlighting the need for
coherence in public action!). What is central is the ability of these "intermediaries"
to rapidly initiate a "research strategic process" (we now know how helpful this
would have been for BSE!).
This strategic process is based on two elements. It first presupposes the existence of
a network of "national" scientific committees (which is activated in less than a week
here!). This network is another form of "Distributed Intelligence" based upon the
articulation of structured advice. Second, we witness here another set of conditions
for flexibility – i.e. adaptation to changing conditions –  which is the capability of
urgently engaging new actions and the procedures that have been thought of "ex
ante". These sprang from the ability to learn from past experience and one can as-
sume here that EVs, through analysis of past problems and actions, helped in identi-
fying relevant design criteria which such emergency actions must answer. In this
fiction, the European committee has the power of creating an "ad-hoc research
group", it can mobilize funds from the "European emergency research fund" and it
can ask the "association of health research institutes" to organize a dedicated team
to pilot the research action.
There might not be a need for having such coordinated sets of actors and formalized
procedures to tackle unexpected issues, in all "sectoral policies" or for all "collec-
tive" or "societal" problems. Still, this last fiction emphasizes the complex web of
actors involved in distributed policymaking and the two-level approach we propose,
whereby only common elements of different situations are pushed forward, building
what we propose to call the "infrastructure" for the promotion of DI architectures.
3.3 Which "Infrastructure" for "DI Architectures"?
- Design Requirements
This last section builds up upon the lessons derived from and comments on the pre-
sented fictions. Of course, it is not meant to discover "fresh" lessons, since the fic-
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tions have been built on purpose to illustrate the qualities that we consider necessary
for the transformations identified in the previous chapters.
All these fictions share first in common, as highlighted in chapter 1, the multiplica-
tion of "policy arenas", no longer taking for granted that the "national" level is the
central one to which all other levels, "regional", "European" or even "thematic"
should be subordinate. We assume that in 2007, our reference year, this still rather
dominant view will have fully faded, leaving on a similar footing, all these different
"policy arenas". This brings to the fore the question of articulation between flexible
combinations of arenas as is proposed in fiction 3. In our fictions, articulations are
not simply linked to co-ordination in speeches or located in periodic compromises
(as for framework programmes), but rather are embedded into procedures (such as
the one linking health scientific committees in fiction 4), institutions (such as the
imagined EP/EC joint committee for new socio-technological programmes of fic-
tion 3) and devices (such as the joint contracts for education  research and innova-
tions imagined in fiction 2).
Second, these fictions also wish to highlight that "Improved Strategic Intelligence”
is not a global characteristic that a "system" would share, but remains dependant on
each "policy arena" and on its decisionmaking practices. Furthermore, within the
same policy arena, these could very well vary, depending on the issue addressed: the
reader has just to look at the present situation and, for instance, at the way in which
health issues such as hepatitis C are addressed, to be convinced of the wide diversity
of situations which will be found in our future Europe with 25 countries and proba-
bly over 150 regions! Furthermore our last fiction highlights the fact that co-
operation patterns and modes of aggregation will depend upon the field or area ad-
dressed, that thus many configurations in different "policy arenas" will be found
depending on the issues addressed: it will not be the same when dealing with health
issues or competitiveness of industrial SMEs! Thus the terminology adopted: we
propose to speak of "architectures" inter-linking "policy arenas" and more specifi-
cally inter-linking those, in the different policy arenas, involved in what we have
termed "strategic intelligence" - i.e. in the management of relevant processes for
information gathering and of "policy debate" between stakeholders.
Third, these fictions try to illustrate "common" requirements needed for such archi-
tectures to develop. These are "qualities" needed for an architecture to enhance dis-
tributed intelligence, or "functions" to be fulfilled for a given architecture to make a
significant (radical?) change compared to an "improved" present day situation, i.e. a
situation which would retain present day features while trying to overcome the ex-
isting fragmentation through more exchanges and even more co-operation between
existing operators of the three major processes identified – EV, TF and technology
assessment – in Chapter 2. To highlight these qualitative transformations we pro-
pose to speak of an architecture of new "infrastructures" for Distributed Intelli-
gence, to highlight the set of new institutional and organisational arrangements that
are required (see figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Improved and Distributed Strategic Intelligence (SI)
We have identified two major functions for this infrastructure dealing with: (1)
"quality assurance", and (2) networking through "centralising/brokering" facilities:
(1) The concept of "quality assurance" is used here in a broader sense than usual
in quality management, and includes attempts of actors to ensure minimum
levels of quality and the assurance, with relevant audiences, that there is some
quality control. Thus, it relates directly to issues of trust: what trust can actors
in policy arenas have in all the "intermediaries" that are mobilised for prepa-
ration or conduct of policymaking. In the fictions we have indicate how bot-
tom-up processes are important, in which various professional actors or bodies
play a role. This includes (hopefully) the notion of ‘civic duty’ to do a good
job, as it works, for example, in peer review within science (even if there are
exceptions). One could think, in addition, of evaluators, innovation bureaus
and the like organising themselves in European professional associations.
(2) The first three fictions highlight the importance of central "brokering nodes"
in the circulation of information and in facilitating "horizontal" inter-linkages.
Two very different types have been put forward by the fictions.
The first type corresponds to "enabling" facilities: this is typical of the TF bank mo-
bilised in all three fictions. The objective is to render results arrived at in one place,
directly accessible in another without requiring direct contacts between actors in
both places. You do not need to contact the promotor of the UK or Japanese Delphi
or the experts they have mobilized to take the results arrived at about solid-state
technology (cf. fiction 3) and to argue for the feasibility of the solar thermal option
proposed. The word "facility" is very important here, since it tells not only about the
need for developing and maintaining/updating a bank, it also underlines the impor-
tance of "harmonisation" work that is understated in the possibility of entering re-
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sults and thus facilitating their circulation: "compatibility" issues do not only raise
technical "inter-operability" problems, they also raise issues about reliability, i.e.
processes through which results are arrived at47.
In the second type, the aim is to facilitate direct contacts. This is the process func-
tion of "technology assessments" or "consensus conferences" as in fictions 1 and 3.
What is needed is not only to identify "assessments" or "conferences" which took
place on the relevant subject and the compromises arrived at, but to take hold of the
reasons why such actions arose, what argumentations were developed by
stakeholders, and through what process "consensus" or "dissensus" was arrived at.
In general, direct contacts between actors remain important. Thus the need for a
different type of "central node", of a more classical directory which acts as a inter-
mediary to facilitate direct connections between relevant actors.
The number of "policy arenas" and the variety of problems addressed – which the
fictions gave only a limited idea of – pushes us to identify another type of "central
node", no longer dedicated to a given "instrument", but more centred on processes
and on the related combinations of instruments. The issue is here less the notion of
best practice, but a topological notion, whereby one looks in a bank of experiences
to identify those related to the problem faced, to see which processes and  what
combinations of instrument and level of deployment of each were used, hoping that
these would be linked to reflexive analyses by their promoters about pitfalls and
relative interest. The universe of situations is so vast that the idea of "best practices"
does not seem appropriate; it is instead replaced by an idea of a repertory of prac-
tices with indications how and why they functioned. The repertory includes more
and more strategic exercises over time, and there must be some structuring and win-
nowing, so that reference to the repertory will make new exercises more relevant
and/or less costly (this is similar to the added value that the Consultancy Consor-
tium in fiction 3 brings to its members). This provides for a third type of "central
node" based on the establishment of repertories and collective learning processes.
To conclude, our position is that a world of distributed policymaking which takes
into account the changing conditions of innovation processes, answers the political
requirements of democratic choice of future technologies, and tries to limit public
expenditure linked to decisionmaking processes, requires a new "infrastructure" for
enabling both "enhanced tools and distributed intelligence". We have identified two
functions this infrastructure should satisfy; "quality assurance" (for all the "inter-
mediaries" or "filters" which populate the different policy arenas) and "central net-
working nodes" for facilitating horizontal linkages and the circulation/ transporta-
tion of knowledge (between policy arenas).
                                                
47 The second cycle of the UK Foresight Programme has moved in this direction with the advent of
a "knowledge pool" (see Chapter 2), a moderated web-based facility for foresight-related knowl-
edge with public access.
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4. Enhancing Distributed Intelligence for Innovation Poli-
cymaking on the European level
In the preceding chapters we have (1) outlined the basic concepts of TF, TA, and
EV, their state-of-the-art with respect to methods and practices as well as potentials
for their combination or interrelated use, (2) the user needs and design requirements
for DI in the context of existing institutions as well as in the light of inter-related
complex innovation systems and innovation policymaking areas, illustrated by a
couple of "fictions".
In the present chapter we will try to translate the design requirements for DI and
Improved Strategic Intelligence depicted in Chapter 3 into some tentative policy
conclusions for European policies.
As already stated, there are at present many challenges to the European S&T sys-
tem(s): the creation of new knowledge in science and technology has to be facili-
tated, the changing nature of technological innovation processes has to be reflected;
the increasing number of actors in the innovation policy arena has to be recognised,
and policies have to be performed more efficiently and effectively. All this calls for
a re-orientation and re-organisation
• of research systems and their relationship with their economic, social and politi-
cal environment (i.e. innovation systems)
• as well as of innovation policymaking procedures.
Thereby one must take into account that we live in a complex and changing world in
which innovation and innovation policy formulation are undertaken by multiple
actors (e.g. universities, applied research institutes, hospitals, research funding in-
stitutions, government agencies, multinational corporations, SMEs, consumer
groups, NGOs, ...) at multiple levels (regional, national, transnational) with different
interests (in terms of funding, regulations) and in the context of various value sys-
tems (scientific curiosity, value-for-money, ethical, ecological, ...).
In trying to improve strategic innovation policymaking, one does not, however, have
to start from scratch. The existing body of experiences with technology foresight,
technology assessment and S/T policy evaluation described above provides a basis
for the development of an advanced innovation policy "planning" approach by try-
ing to enhance, inter-link or even integrate the growing, but still dispersed experi-
ence in these three areas of intelligence.
Current practices in most countries as well as on the EU level, however, have
evolved in an uneven, random and fragmented fashion. Individual exercises have
rarely been inter-linked either conceptually or politically with one another. This lack
of coherent linkages has led to under-utilisation of existing information, knowledge
and capabilities in the process of S/T policy formulation. In consequence, this has
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become a major obstacle to attempts at coherent policy design and practices. For
instance, the task set up in the Maastricht Treaty to arrive at a co-ordinated Euro-
pean science, research and technology policy (including regional, national, and
European levels) so far has not been fed by the systematic use of intelligence tools.
There is a growing need and demand for "combined" or "linked" exercises, for ex-
ample
• the demand for "formative" evaluations which include advice about future strate-
gies based on associated foresight exercises (e.g. for the continuous and flexible
adaptation of running initiatives as required by the 5th Framework Programme,
FP5)
• technology assessment would increase the awareness of social issues in prospec-
tive technology outlooks
• evaluation of socio-economic impacts would be informed by technology assess-
ment efforts, and vice versa.
There is much to be gained from customised exercises involving combinations and
permutations of foresight, evaluation, technology assessment, for all can be seen as
decision support tools which look back to see what we can learn from the past
(evaluation), consider potential options for the future (foresight), and examine the
implications of particular lines of action (technology assessment). There is also
much to be gained from their systematic use and exploitation in multiple settings,
with outputs accessible and distributed across actors, levels, environments etc., for
instance in terms of
• matching of various national research and funding priorities
• distribution of responsibilities between regional, national, or European public or
private actors
• public acceptability of science and technology and an increase in the transpar-
ency of related policy actions.
Against this background, there are several options to improve the current situation
of policy formulation in the EU with regard to both the development of enhanced
tools (ET) and the appropriate use of distributed intelligence (DI).
Starting point of our considerations on European S&T policy is the status-quo,
which can roughly be described in the following way.
Starting with the status quo ...
In RTD policies, the main instrument of the EU has been on the Framework Pro-
grammes (FP), but the Commission also supports many other programmes which
contain research-oriented activities or which contribute, albeit in varying degrees, to
the European research and technology effort and to the formation of a European
science and technology system. These include research activities carried out by Joint
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Research Centres (JRC), a number of research-industry task forces, activities sup-
ported under the Structural Funds, initiatives related to the establishment and devel-
opment of the European Information Society, as well as special programmes in the
fields of environment, energy, international co-operation, education and training,
and health and safety. If we go beyond science and technology policies or innova-
tion policies per se, the European Union's competition policy, regional policy, em-
ployment and social policy, enterprise policy, industrial policy, economic and
monetary policy, and education policy have many significant direct and indirect
effects on scientific and technological development in Europe.
Nevertheless, in the near future the FP is most likely to remain the most significant
single instrument of the Commission to promote scientific and technological devel-
opment in Europe. Accordingly, the Directorate General Science, Research and De-
velopment of the European Commission (DG XII), has a key role to make use of
distributed intelligence (DI) and to develop it as a system. An important part of such
a development is to foster advanced approaches for better co-ordination of the FP
and other science and technology related activities in the Commission.
A great number of institutions and initiatives providing information used in the
policymaking process of S&T policy are already in place at the European level, or
linked and contributing to activities on the European level, but many of them do not
work very well and they are - up to now - not used in a coherent way to formulate
European S&T policy strategies. The reasons for this sub-optimal functioning are as
follows:
• lack of co-ordination between the various functions of the S&T system
• lack of co-operation between the different institutions, namely the various DGs
and the Parliament
• lack of an appropriate assignment of tasks and roles for the involved institutions,
be it on the EU level or national and regional levels
• lack of resources to carry out the assigned tasks sufficiently.
We will argue that there are some achievements to be reached within the existing
institutional context of European S&T policies by:
• improving the methods and practices of TF, TA and EV ("enhanced tools")
• closing gaps in the patchwork of existing institutions and organisations using
elements of DI
• improving the co-operation, the linkages between these institutions and easing
access to the results of DI that already exist on various levels.
This can be exemplified with a look at the various existing institutions and the use
they currently make of the tools of DI and the related infrastructure:
With regard to foresight, there has not been a fully-fledged TF exercise at the Euro-
pean level so far. TF has been undertaken in a number of  individual member coun-
tries or even regions (see examples above). TF (and TA) related projects have also
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been  carried out on the by the Institute for Prospective Technology Studies (IPTS) -
an institute of the Union’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). Some TF related exercises
have also been carried out in the realm of individual sub-programmes of the FPs.
Clearly, there is a need to avoid duplication of costly efforts and to relate existing
activities more closely to each other, especially as the importance of achieving (or
contributing) to the attainment of broader socio-economic goals has risen consider-
able in European S&T policies.
As has been stated above, a centralised large-scale European TF study might not be
feasible and would be very costly. But building up a "brokering node" and an "ena-
bling structure", that would help to design, monitor, take stock of and allow to ac-
cess the results of TF exercises carried out by different actors (enterprises, regions,
nations) is a task that could be accomplished in the short term.
Such an enabling function has to be centrally established, and could be fulfilled ei-
ther by an existing European institution (e.g. IPTS) or  could be delegated to a spe-
cialised unit. It could be assigned the roles of information gathering and synthesiz-
ing the results of existing TF studies. To this purpose it should be equipped with
sufficient resources. Networks of experts/specialised institutions (like European
Technology Assessment Network, ETAN, and European Science & Technology
Observatory, ESTO) would in principle be a good framework for a translation of the
TF results into policy recommendations like advising the Commission regarding the
utilisation of these results and setting topics for TF exercises at national and pro-
gramme levels. For this end, their functioning would have to be improved, including
a better accessability.
As regards technology assessment a considerable numbers of activities exist on the
level of the individual member states (see again the examples given above) along-
side existing but weak institutions at the European level (namely European Parlia-
mentary Technology Assessment, EPTA). As in the case of TF, an important task at
the European level would be to secure an infrastructure for the brokering of results
(e.g. a "directory") but also to facilitate direct contacts between the actors (e.g. in the
form of "consensus conferences"). Again, there is the need for a "central node" in
the circulation of information and in facilitating inter-linkages between the actors.
In the case of TA, the European Parliament has a strong role to play – given the
above mentioned increased importance of broader socio-economic objectives in the
definition of European RTD priorities. However, the role, tasks and resources of a
TA institution serving the European Parliament (EP) should be overhauled to be
able to cope with these tasks. Rather than carrying out TA studies of its own (which
would anyway be of limited scope given the small amount of resources currently
available to EPTA), it should focus on organising the debate on technological prog-
ress and on potential choices for society. In particular, it should focus on improving
an adoption capacity of the EP by digesting and synthesizing the numerous TA
studies carried out in the various EU countries. Here, the role of the EP could be
strengthened: based on the outcome of TA exercises it could have an active role in
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initiating programmes on the bases of TA exercises or to reject or modify individual
programmes brought forward by the Commission.
Evaluation activities have a recognised role and status in the RTD policies of the
European Union. They are institutionally established both at the level of the projects
as well as the evaluation of the programmes (Framework Programmes and Sub-
Programmes, by independent evaluation panels). Nevertheless, EV is confronted
with huge challenges as well - both regarding the methodology and scope of the
evaluations as well as the institutional settings for it.
The DG XII has been rather occupied with organising processes of project evalua-
tions (which is rather project appraisal) than with strategic evaluation. A shift is
needed for the development of methods and approaches to evaluate broader socio-
economic impacts of the FP and other science and technology initiatives. As in the
fields of TF and TA, an important task of the Commission is to mobilize a pool of
expertise available in the various countries on which one could dwell for the indi-
vidual evaluation exercises. In addition, the role of the Commission should be to
encourage the development of methodologies, to help collaboration, to secure the
dissemination of national and European experiences and to assist in "quality assur-
ance" of the evaluations (e.g. by certifying procedures).
Alongside the improvement of the individual tools and their institutional infra-
structure of DI, there is also a need to interrelate these activities more closely than in
the past. In the realm of the Commission, there have been attempts to arrive at such
linkages: there are activities cutting across the delineations of the fields of distrib-
uted intelligence, like ETAN and European Innovation Monitoring System (EIMS),
which incorporate elements of both TF, TA and EV. They were meant (1) to provide
a platform for dialogue, at the European level, between researchers and policymak-
ers on key-technology-society issues and (2) to facilitate dissemination and exploi-
tation of RTD results, technology transfer and innovation. Because of the border-
lines between directorates, results of these studies are not very much used in the
planning and decisionmaking related to the Framework Programmes. Thus, the pre-
sent activities do not really live up to the design requirements of DI sketched above.
As has become clear from the elaboration above, even in a "status-quo scenario",
that is, given the set of existing institutions carrying out the functions of distributed
intelligence for innovation policy, there is room for considerable improvement of
the functioning along the following principles:
• Better co-ordination of TF, TA, EV along the policy-cycle between the DGs. The
role of DG XII as a mediator between other parts of the Commission and national
innovation policy actors could be strengthened.
• Better co-operation between the Commission and the EP in general and in TA in
particular. A stronger role for the EP, especially with regard to TA.
• Better assignment of tasks of the respective institutions, with a focus of EU in-
stitutions on information gathering, synthesizing and preparation of policy deci-
sions rather than carrying out the research tasks themselves.
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• The development and full use of the expertise of national institutions through
commissioning, joint projects etc. is a necessary basis for any EU exercise in TF,
TA and EV. Information exchange and regular mutual staff exchange between
the different communities could be organised on the European level (e.g. in the
form of (bi-)annual conferences on TF, TA, and EV).
• The development of interfaces between science and technology actors and the
general public (e.g. as the Internetbased "Futur-Prozess", recently launched in
Germany extending the Foresight experiences of the 1990s).
... to Improved Strategic Intelligence for policymaking in multi-actor/multi-level
systems
Since innovation policy is increasingly a matter of networking between heterogene-
ous (organised) actors instead of top-down decision-making and implementation
policy decisions are frequently negotiated in multi-level/multi-actor arenas and re-
lated actor networks. Negotiating actors pursue different - partly contradicting - in-
terests, represent different stakeholders perspectives, construct different perceptions
of ”reality”, refer to diverging institutional ”frames”. This scenario assumes a co-
evolution of regional, national and European innovation policy arenas towards an
aggregation in multi-level, multi-actor systems. In this setting new linkages and
distribution of tasks between the European Parliament and national parliaments
would be established, and the Commission (or similar bodies) would concentrate
rather on the "mediation" of innovation policy initiatives in multi-level governance
system. One important source of mediation competencies is the disposal of Strategic
Intelligence.
Beyond this mediation function European innovation policies might put an in-
creased emphasis on mission-orientation towards societal problems (while most
diffusion-oriented programmes would remain in the domain of the member states), a
tendency that has already been emerging with the FP5. In the longer run, new mis-
sion-oriented programmes based on comprehensive considerations of needs and
opportunities as well as impacts could be launched to complement current generic
programmes and other schemes. This would entail more horizontal activities, and
hence different forms of organisation of these activities - e.g. in the form of the
"task forces". Therefore, the above mentioned principles apply here as well: there
would be a need for better co-operation and interaction between DGs dealing with
science, technology and innovation policies and in addition to top-down instru-
ments, bottom-up initiatives must be generated and existing ones supported.
As mentioned above, this was just a sketch to indicate that our elaboration on the
design requirements for DI can already be translated into concrete – though tentative
– policy recommendations in the short term, that is, applied to the current status of
innovation policy formulation in the European Union. We believe that they would
be even more applicable to a European Union in which policy competences and
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procedures are more adopted to the current rapid developments in science, technol-
ogy and societies than is the case at present. We have tried to highlight how such
mechanisms might look like in the scenarios of alternative futures in Chapter 3.
In essence ...
To sum up briefly, in this report we have argued for a new approach which we have
called a system of Distributed Intelligence (DI). In particular, we have suggested the
development of tools which can be used in different combinations to enhance Stra-
tegic Intelligence inputs into policymaking, and access to, and exploitation of Stra-
tegic Intelligence in different locations for different reasons.
Initiating and exploiting these intelligence tools in a systematic fashion across inno-
vation systems will demand new architectures, institutions, configurations and their
inter-linkages. If we manage to develop and implement a new DI infrastructure, then
innovation policies could become more efficient, more relevant, and more demo-
cratic.
In the DI, the architecture refers to actors, levels, and sources of demand supply. In
particular, the role of an intermediary area of spaces and competencies, which
guides and enables the supply of Strategic Intelligence, is becoming central.
There is no single "correct" configuration of tools, procedures, institutions and
structures which can be used in all contexts and situations. So far, the focus has
been on national level policy configurations, but we can see that regions and supra-
national organisations or even "thematic" organisation have become more important
as policy arenas. Moreover, there is a growing need for new configurations which
link up private and public actors and promote their interaction. By private actors we
do not mean only companies, but as well representatives of many other stakeholders
(professional associations, consumer organisations, environmental organisations
etc.).
Since the intelligence needs of different actors are highly specific and "localised",
these needs can only be satisfied via highly customised intelligence gathering and
problem-solving exercises – all differing radically from one organisational and spa-
tial setting to another.
A world of distributed policymaking and DI related to it takes into account the
changing conditions of innovation processes, the political requirements for a demo-
cratic choice of future technologies, and a need to limit public expenditure linked to
decisionmaking processes. Distribution means leaning on bottom-up processes, but
to be effective and trustworthy, standards of quality and quality assurance systems
need to be developed. In addition, of crucial importance will be central networking
nodes, which facilitate horizontal linkages and the circulation of knowledge be-
tween different policy arenas and levels.
